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Un derst an ding Chinese-U.S. Conflict Over
Fr eedom of Religion: The Wolf-Specter F reedom
Fr om Religious Per secution Acts of 1997 and
1998
C h in a  d o es  p er s ec u t e i t s’ p e op l e b ec a u se  o f  re l ig ious  be l ie fs .
T h e re ar e Ca th olic bi sh ops  in  jai l. . . . T h er e a r e P r ot es t a n t
pas tors  in  jai l. T h ey a re p ersecu tin g th e peop le of T ibet . T h ey
are persecut ing  the M oslem  pop u la tion  in  th e nor th w est p orti on
of  the country .  .  .  .  They are oppressin g the people  in  Ch ina .
— Representative Frank Wolf (R-Va)October 28, 1997*
C h i n a ’s  rel igiou s  c om m u n i t y  h a s  m a i n t a i n e d  s t a b il i ty  a n d
h a rm o n y in  a  w or ld  f i l l ed  w i th  na t ion a l d iscord  an d  relig iou s
conf l icts . A l l  na t iona l i t i es ,  rel ig ious  bodies ,  and  c i t izen s  w h o
b e li ev e or  disbel ieve in any  re l ig ion  respect  each o ther ,  coexis t
harm on ious l y , a n d  w ork  join t ly  to  ensure  the  prosper i ty  o f  the
m o th e r la n d .
. . . .
. .  . C l a i m s  t h a t  C h i n a  p ra ct ices  “re l ig ious  persecut ion” are
total ly  ground less  and  are  qu i te sim pl y ba sed  on  u lter ior m o-
t ives .
— Y e Xiaowen, Director, Bureau of Religious Affairs,People’s Republic of China, S eptember 1, 1997**
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 Religiou s freedom in the People’s Republic of Chin a is  a
topic th at  ha s gener at ed mu ch discussion in t he Un ited  Sta tes
in  recent m onths. While U.S. dissatisfaction with China’s hu-
man  righ ts  re cord h as  been  fair ly con s is t ent over the past
tw en ty-five years, only recently has att ention been tur ned to
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1. Fr eed om from Re ligious P ers ecut ion Act of 1997, H .R. 2431, S. 7 72, 105th
Cong.
2. S ee infra  no t e 99 and  accompanying t ext .
3. F o r an outline of the criticisms that h ave been leveled at the bill by these
groups, see infra  note s 113-118 an d accompa nyin g text .
4. F o r a su mm ar y of the sign ificant ch an ges to be offered  in  t he  amendmen t ,
see infra  no t e 122  and accompany ing  t ex t .
5. S ee infra  no t e 87 and  accompanying t ext .
6. US  House Adopts A nti-China B ills, BU S . T I M E S, Nov. 8, 1997 , at  6, available
in  1997 WL 7773707.
7. S ee infra  no t e 92 and  accompanying t ext .
r eported  hu ma n r ights violations in Ch ina wh ich may be de-
scrib ed a s in cludin g violat ions of re ligious fr eedom  righ ts .
Con gr es siona l res pons e to t his  concern  pr ecipita t e d on  May
20, 1997, in  th e form of a p roposed  “Fr eedom  from Relig iou s
Per secut ion Act,”1 offer ed  in  the U .S. H ouse of Represen ta tives
by Fr an k Wolf (R-VA) and in  th e U.S. Sena te by Arlen S p ect er
(R-P A). The  Wolf-Specte r bill wou ld crea te a n Office of Reli-
giou s Per secut ion Monit orin g in t he  Whi te  House and  manda te
cer ta in  expor t  sanct ions  aga inst  na t ions found to be in volved in
“religiou s persecution” under t he defined terms of th e bill.2 At
the tim e of this  writ ing, t he  bill’s sp onsor s a re  pr epa rin g to
in t roduce a su bsta nt ial am endm ent  to th e bill. The pr oposed
amendment at tem pts  to respond  to some of the  cr i t ici sms  of the
bill ra ised by the  admin is t ra t ion , certa in members of Congress,
and som e ch urches  and h uman r igh t s or ga n iza t ion s.3  The bill
as am ended will be titled the Freedom From Religiou s P er se cu-
tion Act of 1998.4
In  addit ion to the Wolf-Spect er bill, in early November ,
1997, th e Hou se pa ssed , by overwh elmin g ma jorities , nin e bills
which  can  be fa ir ly d es cr ibe d a s “a n t i-Ch in a” legis la t ion .5 Dur -
ing the  deba te  su r rounding these bills, China wa s char acter ized
“as th e world ’s lea din g hu m a n  r igh t s  viol a tor , and  it s  r eg ime
compared to Nazi  Germany and  S ta lin ’s  Sov ie t  Union .”6
While  an ti-Ch ina  sen tim en t w as  build ing in  Congr ess , th e
Clin ton  admin i st r a t ion p ur su ed a  policy of “enga geme nt ” with
China’s leader sh ip, which  culm ina ted  in t he s um mit  mee tin g
between  Pr eside nt  Clint on a nd  Chin ese P res iden t J ian g Zemin
in  lat e October , 1997. Ma ny in Con gress saw the  admin is t ra -
t ion ’s act ions  as  unacceptab le  “appeasement”7 of a governm ent
tha t  has consistently ignored human  rights an d religious free-
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8. S ee Er ic Kolodner , Religious Right s in  China: A Comparison of International
Hum an Ri gh ts L aw  an d C hi nes e Dom est ic Legi sla tion , 12 UCLA P AC . BA S IN  L.J . 407,
409-14 (199 4).
9. S ee, e.g., Andre w Pa u & N at ha n J . Diam ent , Recent  Develop m en t ,
Narrowin g “Poli t ical  Opinion” As Grounds for Asy l u m —I .N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 33
H ARV. IN T’L L.J . 610, 627 (1992) (“[T]he Chinese governmen t insis ts  t ha t  i t  pro t ec t s
ind iv idua l huma n rights to the greatest extent possible at this stage  of its econom ic
deve lopmen t . . . .”); Ren Yan shi, China  Helps Improve In t ’l  Human  Rights
Un dertak ings , BE I J I N G RE V., Nov. 17-23, 199 7, at  24, available i n  1997 WL 14325135
(“The Chin ese gover nm ent  ha s alwa ys res pected  th e prin ciples lai d  d ow n  in  t he  UN
Char ter  to p ro mo te  hu ma n r igh ts  an d fu nd am en ta l fr ee dom s.”).
dom standa rds u rge d by t he  int er na tion al comm un ity. 8 At  the
same t im e, t he Chin es e gover nmen t  has con t in ued  to express
ou t rage at  wh at  it s ees a s a n im per mis sible a ffront  to it s sov-
ereignty—U.S. int erfer ence wit h Ch ina ’s in ter na l affair s. Ch ina
also con t inues  to hold i t se lf ou t  a s  commi t ted  to in terna t iona l
human right s law a nd global efforts t o protect religious free-
dom.9
This  Comment  will explain som e  of the h is tor ica l, p h ilo-
soph ical, and geop olit ica l r ea son s for  Ch in a’s fa ilu re t o res pon d
to U.S.  pr es su re for  religiou s fr eedom  refor m. P ar t  II  of th e
Commen t  descr ibes th e cur re nt  st at e of religious  act ivity a nd
re ligiou s persecut ion in China  today an d explains  th e govern -
ment stru cture responsible for regulating religious act i vity.
Pa r t  III gives an overview of th e U.S. res ponse to th e issue of
reli giou s r igh t s abu se s in  Ch in a . It  br iefl y d iscuss es  the Clin ton
admin ist ra t ion’s policy of “en gagem en t,” as well as the adm inis-
t ra t ion’s professed “stra tegic part nership” with China. It also
discusses  th e con gr essional ba cklash a gainst  th e Pr esident ’s
approach , namely , t he m ea su res  cont em pla ted  by t he Wolf-
Specter  bill and other recent an ti-China legislation. Part  IV
look s at  th e re ligious free dom (or la ck of it) in Chin ese h ist ory,
as well as the na tionalist,  anti-imperialism, and  an t i-Chr is t ian
movemen t s th at  took place in ninet eent h a nd ea rly twen tieth
cen tu ry China , and  at  some of th e differen ces between  U.S . and
Chinese views of law an d proper  condu ct. Par t V gives sugges-
t ion s for a  bett er U.S. r esponse t o the pr oblem. It ar gues t ha t
the Wolf-Specter bill, if pass ed, will not improve China ’s en-
forcemen t  of re ligious  freedom and ma y actu ally foreclose possi-
bilities for  fu tu re  impr ovemen t . Th is  Pa r t  a rgues tha t  a  be t t er
way to increa se t he leve l of religiou s free dom in  Chin a is  to
p romote change fr om wit h in  by e xpanding oppor tun it ies  for
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10. S ee ASIA WATCH, H U M A N  RIGH T S  WATCH, F R E E D O M O F  RE L I G IO N  I N  CH I N A 5
(1992) [hereinafter A SIA WATCH ‘92].
11. The mos t com pr eh en sive  an d a ut hor ita tive recent statement  of the Chinese
Communis t Pa r ty (CCP ) on r eligious policy is set fort h in  Docu m en t N o. 19 : T he
Basic Viewpoint an d Policy on the Religious Question During Our Country’s Socialist
Peri od  (1982) [hereinafter Document N o. 19], reprinted in  AS IA WATCH ‘92, supra  no t e
10, app. at 36. This CCP interna l document  was originally considered con f iden t ia l  bu t
w a s soon wide ly leak ed. S ee ALAN  H UNTER & KIM-KWONG CH A N, P ROTESTANTI S M  IN
CONTEMPORARY CH I N A 49 (1 993 ).
Document  No. 19 st at es th at  “the P ar ty’s and gover nm ent ’s bas ic task  in its
r e ligious wor k w ill b e t o fir ml y im ple me nt  an d ca rr y out i ts  policy of fre edom  of
re ligious belief . . . to build a modern and powerful Socialist state an d complete t he
grea t ta sk of un ifying th e coun tr y.” ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, app. a t 39; see
also i d . a t 40 (“[T]he Part y’s basic task is to unite all the people .  .  . believers and
non-be li ever s alike[] in order that  all may strive to construct  a  m odern , power fu l
socialist st at e.”).
i n te ract ion  with  the out side w orld, h elpin g est ablis h t he r ule  of
law  th rough in creased bu sin ess  conta cts a nd  grea te r in te gra -
t ion  of Ch in a  in to the globa l econ omy, a nd b ackin g off fr om the
use of econ omic for ce as  a  means  of coercing Chin a t o expan d it s
recogn it ion  of reli giou s freed om. While the r emedies su ggested
he re a re s omewhat  a ligned  wit h  the Clin ton  a d m in is t ra t ion’s
policy of “engagement” and  the free t r ade a rguments  of va r ious
U.S. busin ess groups , the s ignifican ce of the a ppr oach outlined
in  th i s Comment  is  tha t  it  does  not  proceed on the basis of U.S.
business  in te res t s  bu t  on  the bas is of a genu ine U .S. int ere st  in
freedom  of re ligion a br oad. Wh ile t he  mot ivat ions b eh ind  U.S.
business  inter ests  an d U.S. religious freedom inter ests  ma y be
very differen t, th e policies th at  would promote ea ch of th em, in
th i s setting, are complementa ry. Thus, opposi t ion  to the Wolf-
Specter  bill does not h ave to mea n a ppeas emen t of China ,  or
sellin g out  to  U.S.  business  inter ests , but in stea d ma y repr e-
sent  a  lon g-t er m  commit men t  to fost er in g polit ica l, economic,
and social trust  with  a  coun t ry  that  i s s lowly  moving  in  the
direction th e sponsors of the bill would like to see it ta ke.
II. RE L I G I O N  A N D  RE L I G I O U S  P E R S E C U TI O N  IN  CH I N A TOD AY
 The cur re nt  Chin ese gov er n m e n t  t ol er a t e s some for ms of
relig iou s activity, but clear ly does not encourage r eligious be-
lie f.10 Religion  is  pr otect ed to the  ex ten t  t ha t  it  con t r ibu tes  t o
China’s pr ogress  on th e socialist  pa th ,11 bu t  no fu r the r.
Alth ough  th e official policy of the Chinese Commu nist Par ty
(CCP) towa rd  religion  is  one of fr eedom  of belie f, t he m ot iva t ion
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12. S ee Document N o. 19, reprinted in  ASIA WAT C H  ‘92, su pra no te 10 , app . a t
37 (“Religion will even tu ally disa ppea r from  hu ma n h istor y. But  it will disappear
na tu ra lly on ly  th rough  the long-t erm  developm ent  of Socialism a nd C omm un ism  . . . .
Those who think  tha t . . . religion will die out with in a short  period, are n ot being
re al ist ic.”).
13. The CCP reas ons tha t when  religion is driven underground by excessive
coer cion,  it  th en  becom es  difficu l t  t o c on t rol, a nd  it a lso cea ses  to con tr ibu te  to t he
economic g rowth  of  the s t ate. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note  10, at  6 (sum ma rizing
China’s view tha t r eli gion  “sh ou ld b e h ar ne ss ed  to s er ve t he  in te re st s of t he  st at e”).
14. S ee Docu m en t N o. 19, reprinted in  ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  no te 10 , app . a t
44 (“[U]nd er  socia lism , th e on ly cor re ct fu nd am en ta l wa y to s olve t he  re ligiou s
qu est ion  lie s p re cise ly in  sa fegu ar din g t he  fre ed om  of re ligi ou s b eli ef.”).
15. S ee id. at 40 (“Reli gion  wi ll  n ot  be per mit ted t o . . . oppose the  Pa rt y’s
leade rsh ip or t he  socia list  sys te m,  or t o des tr oy na tion al or  et hn ic un ity .”). For  th e
cons t i tu t iona l embodiment of the sa me rest riction on religious freedom, see  ZH O N G H U A
RENMIN  GONGHEGU O XI AN F A [Con st it ut ion ] [Xia nfa ], a r t 36 (198 2) (P.R.C.), tr an sla ted
in  TH E  CO N S TI T U TI O N  OF  T H E  P EOPLE ’S  RE P U B L IC  O F  CH I N A 32 (1st ed. 1983)
[hereinafter  CONSTITUTION  O F  CH I N A] (prohibitin g citizen s from p ar ticipat ing in
re ligious activit ies th at  “disrupt  public orde r, im pair  th e hea lth  of cit i zens  or  i n t er f ere
with  the edu cational system.”). Similarly, Article 51 declares tha t “[t]he e xe r cise by
citizens . . . of their fr eedoms  an d righ ts m ay n ot infrin ge upon  th e int ere s t s o f t he
stat e, of s oci et y a nd o f t he c ol le ct iv e. ” Id . at 39.
16. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10 , at  6, 11 -16 (lis tin g cat egor ies  of
r e s t r ic t ions on  re ligi on ).
17. S ee id . at 6.
beh ind  th at  policy is th e idea  th at  sa fegua rd ing r eligious
freedom will facilitat e religion’s na tu ra l demise. 12 Accordin g to
Chinese theor is t s,  un t il t he t im e when  reli gion  na t u r a l ly dies
ou t , i t  should be tolera ted  by th e st at e in or der  to pr event  its
bein g driven underground.13 In sum, the policy of t he CCP is to
p r ot ect  religious a ctivity to the exten t n ecessar y to promote it s
ext in ct ion ,14 with t he caveat  t h a t  religion m ust  never be
allowed to disru pt t he h ar mony an d progress  of th e sta te. 15
The lon g list  of res t r ict ion s t ha t  China  p laces  on  re ligious
freedom  in clu de s t he following: r es t r ict ion s on  the n umber  of
officially re cognized r eligions, r es t r ict ion s on  regi st ra t ion  of
meet ing places , r es t r ict ion s on  fisca l m anagem en t  of reli giou s
inst i tu t ions an d a ctivitie s, r est rict ions on t he r ecru it ing and
t ra in ing of religious  “pr ofessiona ls,” res tr ictions on  dist ribu tion
of r e ligious  li t er a tu re,  re st r ict ions  on pr oselyt izat ion, a nd
res t r ict ions on reli giou s pract ices dee me d “sup er st itiou s.”16
Ea ch of th ese is discussed in more det ail below.
The n u m ber of officially recognized  (or “legal”) religions in
Chin a  is limited  to five: Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestant ism,
Daoi sm, and  Is lam.17 The  CCP  exer cises strict contr ol over th e
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18. S ee id .
19. S ee id . Thes e ass ociations, or gan ize d  in  t he 195 0s on t he n at ional,
provincial,  and county levels, were disbanded du ring th e Cultur al Revolution but later
revived. See id.
20. S ee ASIA WATCH, H U M A N  RI G H T S  WATCH, CONTINUING RE L I G I O U S  REPRESSION
IN  CH I N A 2 (1993) [hereina fter ASIA WATCH ‘93].
21. Id .
22. Docu m ent  No. 6: Circular Issu ed by the Central Comm ittee of the Chine se
Communi s t Party and th e State Council On Som e Problems Concer ni ng  Fu rt her
Improv ing Wor k on  Rel igion  (199 1) [h e r e in a ft er  Docum ent N o. 6], reprinted in  ASIA
WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, app. a t 33.
23. Kolo dn e r , supra  not e 8, a t 4 25; see also id.  (quot ing  th e st at em en t of
Reve rend Lin Xiangao, a Baptist Minister  who spent  more th an  20 ye ar s in  pr ison
for  his religious beliefs, that  the Th ree-Self Patr iotic Movement  was “a tool used by
the Gover nm en t t o des tr oy Ch ri st ian ity ”); ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10,  at 6 (“The
pat riotic  as soci at ion s a re  no t v olu nt ar y or ga ni za ti on s of clergy and  la i ty a s  t he
government  ma in ta in s, b ut  a k ey p ar t of t he  st at e bu re au cra cy staffed by governm ent
and/or pa rt y fu nct ion ar ies .”).
24. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘93, supra  note 20, at  2.
inst i tu t ions and leaders of these religions by means of “pa t r iot i c
associat ions,” which pu rport edly act as “liaisons” between  th e
govern men t  and  the pa r t icu la r  church .1 8  The five  na t iona l
associa t ions a re  the Chinese Buddhist Association, the Chinese
Cat holic Pa tr iotic Associat ion  (CPA), the  Thr ee-Self Pa tr iotic
Movement  (TSPM), the Chinese Daoist  Associa t ion ,  and  the
Chinese Is la mic Associa t ion .19 The pa t r iot i c associa tions  a re
accoun ta ble to the  governmen t  th r ou gh t he Re ligious Affairs
Bureau  (RAB). 20 The purpose of th e as sociat ions is t o “tr an sm it
directives and policies to the official chur ches, keep the
govern men t  informed of the n eeds and activities of these
inst i tu t ions , and r egula te  th eir  int er na l affair s.”21 CCP Cent ra l
Commi t tee an d St at e Coun cil Docu m ent  No.  6 descr ibes  the
pa t riotic a ssocia tion s a s “a br idge by w hich  th e Pa rt y an d
govern men t  un i te with  and educa te re ligious p er sona ges.”22 It  is
clear, however, th at  in pr actice the pa tr iotic associations a re a
t ool of th e CC P for con t rollin g “ever y m in ute det a il of r eligious
act ivity in  Chin a.”23
Con grega t ion s me et ing u nd er  th e a egis of th e r eleva nt
pa t r iot i c ass ocia t ion  are con side red  “open ,” “official ,” or
“affiliat ed” chur ches.24 All oth er  re ligious a ctivit y is
au tomat ica l ly illegal. In sp ite of that  fact, man y Protes ta nt s
and Catholics in  C h ina r eject t he  re st rict ions im posed  by th e
pa t r iot i c associations and p r actice th eir r eligion wit hin  an
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25. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, at  6.
26. The policy i s la rg ely a  re act ion a gai ns t t he  fore i gn  m iss ion s t ha t w er e on ce
active  in C hin a a nd  th e h ist orica l “hu mi lia tion ” Chin a  expe r ienced  in  i t s dea lings  with
the imper ialist  West, w hich it  ass ociated wit h t he presence of foreign missionaries.
F o r discussion of the an ti-imperialism , ant i-Chris t i an  movemen t s  of  the  19th  and
ear ly 20th centu ries, see infra  Par t IV.B.
27. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, at  6.
28. S ee id . (“[T]he ‘th ree-self ’ policy requ i r es  s everance  of  al l l inks  wi th  the
Vat ica n  and local election of bishops rath er t h a n  a p p oi n tme nt  by t he  Pop e. F or
be li ever s .  .  . [this] is n ot  a political matter , as Chinese au thorities view it, but goes
to th e h ea rt  of wh at  it  me an s t o be  Ca th olic. ”).
29. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘93, supra  note 20, at  2.
30. F o r Protestants  in  China ,  underground re ligious  ac t iv ity  has  taken  the  fo rm
of “house  churches ,” congrega t ions r anging in  size  from a han dful of people to over
1,000 who m eet in  individu al h o m es  r ath er t ha n r egist ere d me etin g places . S ee ASIA
WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10 , a t 7 . It  is e st im at ed t ha t t he re  ar e a rou nd  20,0 00 s uch
groups. See id.  For Catholics, there a re app roximatel y 25 bishops  in Ch ina  who ha ve
been illegally con secra ted  by Rome , an d wh o in tu rn h ave ordain ed about  two
hun dred  un der grou nd p ries ts. See id.  at 6-7. These Cath olic congregations meet
secret ly an d conduct  chur ch affair s inde pend ent ly of governm ent  regu lat ion. See id.
a t  7. Ra ids  on t he se “u nofficia l” rel igion s a r e frequent a nd ma y have increased
significan tly  since 1 990. See id.  According to Xi Qui Fu, a Ch inese m an wh o
successfu lly fled  re ligio us  per se cut ion  in  Ch in a,  “[t]h ous an ds  of hou se  chu r c h l eade r s
got  arrested an d tortured in a brut al way, such as being hanged three days and
nights, forced  to d ri nk  sa lty  wa te r, b ur ne d wit h h ot w at er , sh ocke d by  ele ct ri c st ick
and be ing  sexua l ly  abuse d .” M a ry Klau s, Su pport for Religious Freedom Abroad
Sought, Goodling-Specter Hearing Designed to Raise Awareness, H ARRISBURG P ATRIOT,
Dec.  5, 1997, available in  1997 WL 7540264.
underground (or  “illega l”) chu rch  movement .25 The  difficult y
tha t  many  Protes tant s  and  Ca thol ics  face in accept ing the
au thor i ty of th e p a t riot i c associa t ions  s t ems  from the
govern men t’s “thr ee-self” policy.26 The  “th ree -self” policy
provides tha t  a ll officia l r eli gion s m ust  m e et  t he  requ i remen t s
of se lf-a dm in is t ra t ion , self-s upp or t , a nd s elf-p ropa ga t ion .27 F or
Ca tholics  in China, the centra l concern is th a t  the  relevan t
govern men t-app roved pa t r iot ic ass ocia t ion , t he CPA, is  not
perm itted  to r ecognize t h e  a u thor it y of t he Va t ica n .28 For
Protestant s, th e concern  is over  the  fact  tha t  the ir  govern men t-
app roved pa t riotic association, the TSPM, oversees a “post-
d en om i n a t ion a l Pr otes ta nt ism ,” w h ich  con s ol id a t es  a ll
P rotes tant  denomina t ions into one church, “ignoring differences
in  doctr ine  an d lit ur gy.”29 Th es e fa ctors h ave l ed  to the
pr olife ra t ion  in Ch ina  of a significan t  r e ligious  underground
movement .30
Like rest r i ct ions  on  the  number of officially recognized
reli gion s,  res tr ictions on  regis tr at ion of religious m eet ing places
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31. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, at  11.
32. S ee id .
33. S ee id . (citing the biblical teaching of a “second comin g” as an example of
a  subject that  if preached in a serm on, would deny th e con grega t ion  off ic ia l
re gist ra tion  of it s m ee ti ng  pla ce).
34. S ee id . (not ing tha t  such  an  a p p li ca t ion m ay r esu lt i n t he  congr ega tion ’s
be ing “re st ri cte d or  eve n d isb an de d”).
35. S ee id . at 11-12 (citing examples of unregistered Cat holic  semina r i es  and
convents an d P ro te st an t h ou se  chu rch es  th at  we re  th e s ub ject  of pol ice r ai ds ).
36. S ee Kolodner , supra  note 8, at  428.
37. S ee id .
38. S ee id .
have a significant im pact on r eligious freedom in Chin a. The
effect  of thes e r es t r ict ion s i s t o su pp res s r eli giou s a ct ivity. The
Religiou s Affair s Bu rea u (RAB) ma int ain s s t r ict  ad min ist ra tive
con t rol over all churches, m osques, tem ples, an d other  “mee tin g
point s.”31 All places of worsh ip must  be  regis ter ed  with  the RAB
and must  comply wi th  officia l  st a ndards. 32 As  a  r esu lt ,
congr ega t ion s t ha t  es pou se  pr in cip les  de em ed  to be
“p r opaganda” by t he s t a te will  be  de n ied  regi st ra t ion , a nd b oth
its  lea der s a nd  me mb er s m ay face ar res t  and  deten t ion .33
Fu rt her more, un official congrega t ions  a re somet imes  reluctan t
to a pply for  regis tr at ion becau se of th e int ens e scru tin y by loca l
a u t horities that  such an application often provokes.3 4
Unr egistered  meet in g pla ces  a re fr equen t ly t he t a rget  of police
raids, an d t hose a tt end ing su ch ser vices ma y be ph ysically
assaulted,  arr ested, interr ogated, a nd /or  have  thei r  proper ty
confiscated. 35
Rest r ict ion s on recr u it men t  and t ra in in g of r eli giou s
pers onnel cons t it u t e  anothe r  sign i fi can t  limi t a tion  on reli giou s
freedom  in  China . Many regi ona l and  loca l  laws  prov ide tha t
only regi st er ed  reli giou s p er son nel m ay con du ct  reli giou s
services or hold office.36 Oth er r egiona l an d local laws  pr ohibit
r eli giou s leader s from t ra velin g to pr ose lyt ize  or  pr ea ch  wit hout
government  appr oval, restr ict the freed om of religious lea der s
to t r a in  novices, and pr event citizens u nder  th e age of eighteen
from join in g r eli giou s inst it u t ion s. 37 This  legislation also allows
gover nment officials to limit t he n um ber of religious pers onnel
ava ilable  to a  den omin at ion t hr ough  a syst em of qu otas. 38 These
regional and local laws are in response to policy directives from
the centr al governmen t. In Documen t No. 19, th e CCP s t a t es  it s
poli cy wi th  res pe ct  to “rel igiou s p rofessiona ls :”
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39. Docu m ent  No. 19 , reprinted in  ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  n ote 10, app. at  41
(emph asis  ad de d).
40. Docu m ent  No. 6 , reprinted in  ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, app. a t 32.
41. ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  no te  10,  at  14 (q uo ti ng  from D ocu me nt  No.  19).
42. S ee id . (citing examples of restrictions placed on official semina ries in
China) .
43. Kolodner,  supra  note 8, at  429.
44. S ee id .
W e m u s t  un relen t ingly yet  pat ient ly  forw ar d  th eir ed u cat ion
in  patr io t i sm , u p h old ing  t h e la w, s u pp ort in g socia lism , an d
up holding n at ional  .  .  .  uni ty .  .  .  .
W e m u st  fost er  a  la r ge  n u m be r  of f e rven t  pa t r io t s i n  ev er y
re ligion  w h o a cce p t t h e  le a de r sh ip  of t h e  P ar t y a n d
gove rn m en t, [a n d] fir m ly su pp ort  th e socia list  pa th  . . . .
Mar x i sm  is  in com pa tib le w ith  an y t h eis tic w orld view . Bu t
in  t e rm s  o f po l it i ca l  act ion ,  Marx i s t s  and  pa tri otic b e l ievers
ca n , in de ed  m u st , for m  a  U n i t ed  F r on t  i n  th e  co m m on  e ffo rt
for s ocial ist  m ode rn iza tion .39
Fur ther , in Document  No. 6, the directive is given th at
“[p]reach ing and  mis s iona ry work by self-styled preachers and
other illega l m issionary wor k  m ust  be firm ly cur bed.”40 The
only religiou s p rofession a ls p er mit t ed  to pe r form reli giou s
dut ies a r e  those who, upon exam inat ion, are found t o be
“‘politically  reliable, patriotic and law-abiding,’ who ha ve been
app roved  by a  pa t r iot ic a ss ocia t ion  an d wh o ar e re gist ere d wit h
the appropr ia t e level of th e [RAB].”41 Ed uca tion  an d t ra inin g of
religious personnel is also strictly regulated.42
These res tr ictions on  recr uit men t a nd  tr ain ing of reli giou s
pers onnel ha ve ha d, a nd  will contin ue t o ha ve, a d evas ta tin g
im pa ct  on  reli gion  in  Ch in a . As noted  by on e com men ta tor ,
W it h ou t  l e a d er s fr om  th e you n ger  gen er at ion s, t h e va riou s
re ligiou s  d e n o m i n a t i o n s  a r e  t h r e a t e n e d  w i t h  e x t i n ct i on .  B y
sc reen in g ap plica nt s, es ta blish ing  qu ota s, a nd  cen sor ing
re ligiou s  t r a inin g m at er ia ls, t h e C P C ca n  gu t t ra dit ion al
re ligiou s  b e li e f a n d  p r a c t ic e,  a n d  r e p la c e  t h e m  w it h  ve r sion s
m o r e subord ina t e  to  the  s t a t e . W h i l e  th e old er  re ligiou s
pe r sonn e l migh t  object ,  the  you n g e r  ge n e r a t i o n , r e a r e d  o n
Par ty  ideo logy , w i l l a lmos t  ce r t a in ly  be  more  a cqu iescen t . 43
Most  of the cle rgy in  Ch in a  a re old , a nd gover nmen t  res t r ict ion s
limit  th e possibility for upwa rd social and  economic progress
with in  the religious professions.44 As  a  resu lt ,  Ch ina  is
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45. W. Gar y Vaus e, Ti bet t o T i ena nm en: Ch in ese H um an  R igh ts  an d t he U ni ted
S ta tes  Forei gn  Poli cy, 42 VA N D. L. RE V. 157 5, 16 00 (1 989 ) (not in g, h owev er , t ha t s in ce
1981 “th e gov er nm en t h as  re la xed  con tr ols  som ew ha t on  acce ss  to t he  cler gy”).
46. S ee supra  no t e 16 and  accompanying t ext .
47. S ee generally ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note  10, at  12-16 (discussin g
res t r ic t ions on fis cal m an age me nt , dis tr ibu tion  of rel igiou s lit er at ur e, p ros elyt iza tion ,
and su per st iti ous  act ivit ies ); AS I A WATCH ‘93, supra  note  20, at  5-6 (discussin g
res t r ic t ions on freedom of expression, religious liter atu re, an d religious tra ining); R.
Lanier  Brit sch, The Current L egal Status of Christ i a n it y  in  Ch ina, 19 95  BYU  L. RE V.
347, 359 -60 (d iscu ss in g r es tr ict ion s on  re ligi ou s a cti vit ies  of for e ig n er s in  China);
Kolodner,  supra  note 8, at 428-430 (discussing restrict ions on re ligious per sonn el,
places of worshi p, an d re ligious a ssociat ion); Vaus e, supra  note 45, at  1600-02
(di scuss ing re st ri ction s on  re ligiou s pe rs onn el, con ta ct w ith  foreign  r e ligious
org an iza tion s an d le ad er s, a nd  su pp re ss ion  of Tib et ’s “feud al ” socie ty ).
48. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, at  5.
49. Id . 
exper iencin g “a pr essing sh orta ge of priests, ministers, monks,
ima ms , an d oth er  re ligious le ad er s.”45
Oth er  governmen ta l r es t r ict ion s on  the p ract i ce  of re ligion ,46
which  ostensibly ha ve th e pur pose of prom otin g na tion al u nit y
and th us  pr ogress  on th e socialist  pa th , ha ve ha d a nd  contin ue
to h ave a  sim ilar  st ifling effect on re ligious a ctivity in  Chin a. 47
In  add it ion  to the r egu la t ion s m en t ion ed  her e, w hich
ar guably constitut e repression becau se of th e bur dens t hey
p lace on religion, there are literally thousands of exam ples  of
ou t r igh t  r e ligious  persecu t ion  in  Ch i na. Som etim es t his
per secut ion occurs a t t he dir ection of th e par ty/governm ent ,
somet i m es with  its  acqu iescen ce, an d som etim es in  spit e of its
best e ffor t s . F rom a  Wes te rn perspect ive , the  examples  range
from th e m er ely r idiculou s t o th e dis tu rb ingly b r u t a l. A few
br ie f accoun t s  wi ll  il lu s t r a t e t he  spect rum.
In  November 1991, a circular was issued by the U nited
Fron t , the  Propaganda  Depar tment , and  t he Religious Affairs
Bureau  in t he G ua ngd ong pr ovince, res tr icting Ch ris t mas
celebrations:48
[A]ll o u t w a r d  m a n i fe s t at i o n s  o f t he  h o liday ,  such  a s  l an te r ns ,
fes t ive  ligh ts  an d p lay ing  re cord ing s of Ch ris tm as  car ols in
pu blic,  w e r e  ba n n e d .  S ch o ol  a u t h or i t ie s  w er e  e xh o r t e d t o
d i s su a d e  st u de n ts  from  org an izin g or  t a k in g pa r t  i n  f e s t ivi t i e s ,
a n d  g ov e r n m e n t  a g e n ci es  w e r e t ol d  to  dr a w  u p  m e a s u r es
d i scoura g ing  church  a t t enda nce  o r  t he  exchan ge  o f ca rds .49
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50. In  Decem ber  1997, i t  w a s reported t hat  “Rudolf the [Red-Nosed] Reindeer,
blow -up  San ta s, . . . an d Chr istma s tree s of a ll si zes  ad orn ed h ote l lobbi es,  sh op
windows and even pr ivate h omes as Sha nghai’s largely ath eist population embr aced
the festive  sea son.” Fun-loving Chinese Join the Faithful to Embrace Christmas ,
AGENCE  F RANCE-P R E S S E , Dec.  25, 1997, available in  1997 WL 13460747. It  was also
reported  that “the main Xujiahui Catholic cathedral .  .  . held a Christmas Eve mass,
with  several ma sses scheduled for Christm as day,” that “[s]ome 1,500 worshiper s
packed th e pews w hile h un dred s of other  curiou s non -believer s mille d ar oun d th em,”
tha t  there were Protestan t services held Christm a s  E ve  and  Chr i s tmas Day,  and  tha t
in  Be ij in g t he m unicip a l g over nmen t  “th rew  a  pa r ty for  the c it y’s  cler gy .” Id .
51. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘93, supra  note 20, at  2-3.
52. DI N G GU AN G XUN , A SP E E C H  T O T H E  NATIONAL P EOPLE ’S  CO N G R E S S , ON
CORRECTLY DE A LI N G  WI T H  TH E  RE L I G I O U S  IS S U E (1992) [hereinafter D I N G], rep rin ted
in  ASIA WATCH ‘93, supra  note 20, at  36.
53. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘93, supra  note 20, at  2-3.
It  must  be noted, however, that  at least  in  some p laces in  Chin a
res tr ictions on  celebra tion  of Chris tm as  seem  to ha ve ma rk edly
diminished in recent years.50
Oth er  exa mples  of reli giou s p er se cu t ion  in  Ch ina  a re more
serious. In J uly of 1992, Bishop Ding  Guangxun , l eader  of
China’s offi cia l P rotes tant  church ,  spoke  a t a  Nat ional People’s
Congress (NP C) mee tin g, callin g for  a n  e nd to the “wind of
suppression” wh ich  had  “wrongly” blown up in  some places
against  un regi st e red  P rote st an t  ch u r ches.51 B ishop  Ding
described some of the  methods used t o su pp res s r eli giou s
act ivity:
They  m obilize  ca dr es , PS B [t h e P u blic S ecu rit y Bu re au , or
police ,] and  Peop le ’s  Mi l it i a  t o  use  e l ec t r i c ba tons ,  t ea r  up
re ligiou s  p i c tu re s ,  con f isca t e  B ib le s  and  r e l ig ious  pu b l i ca t ions ,
im pr ison  the  be l i eve r s ,  f ine t hem , cut  off th eir  e lectr ic i ty ,
w a te r  and  socia l  s ecu r i ty  g ra in  supp l i e s ,  demol ish  h ouses  a n d
oth er  su ch a ctiv itie s. . . .
[T]his  w ind  o f  suppres s ion  i s  aga ins t  t h e  Pa r ty ’s  policy, a n d
the  h a rm  i t  i s  caus in g  i s  s e r ious . 52
Alth ough  Bis hop D in g a t t em pt ed  to sh ow on ly t ha t  the r egiona l
and local govern me nt s wer e st ra ying fr om pa rt y/gover nment
policy, his a ppeal wa s ignored. In  ear ly 1993, sh ort ly afte r h is
speech to the N PC, B ishop D in g con sp icu ously wa s n ot
r eelected to t he  Eigh th  Na tion al P eople’s Con gre ss, t hou g h  he
ha d been a  delegate sin ce 1964.53
Bishop Ding  poin ted  ou t  tha t  the  in te rna t iona l
r eper cuss ion s of China ’s sup pres sion of religion “are very
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54. DI N G, reprinted in  ASIA WATCH ‘93, supra  note 20, at  36.
55. Recently,  China  has t ried to ass uage t he hea t of Western d isappr oval by
re leas ing ke y r eligi ous  an d political dissidents, on the condition tha t th ey will never
be a l lowed  to r e tu rn  to Ch in a. On e recen t exa mple is  th e rele ase of Wei J ingsh eng,
who was gene ra lly rega rde d as  Chin a’s “top dis siden t.” S ee J im  Mann , China’s
Ch am pion  of Democracy, U.S. E ffort Led Chi na  to R elease D iss id ent , L. A. TI M E S, Nov.
17, 1997, available in  1997 WL 14001390. Ch ina  expects  th at  th is app roach  will
appease delicate Western sen sibilit ies  an d a t t he  sa me  tim e se rv e t he  pu rp ose of
exi li ng dissid ent  voices overs eas . See id.  ( “Ch ina ’s  Communis t Pa r ty  le a ders hip a gain
succeeded in  sh ipp ing  a  d issen ter  abroad  and pre vent ing any  ser ious  pol it i ca l
oppos iti on  from ta king r oot on Chine se soil.”). While some in the West ma y conclude
tha t  th e rele ase of Wei J ingsh eng sign als a  vict ory for U.S. policy, it must be
remem bered  that  his release is consistent with  China’s policy o f s il enc ing  those  who
would  “d is rup t  pub li c o rde r ,” XI AN F A, a r t  32 (1982), transla t ed  in  CONSTITUTION  OF
CH I N A, supra  not e 15, a t 32, or  “destr oy na tion al . . . u n ity.” Docu ment  No. 19 ,
repr in ted  in  ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, app. a t 40.
56. ASIA WATCH ‘93, supra  note 20, at  3-4.
57. S ee Human  R ight s  in  Ch ina  Hear ing, supra  note * at *30-*33.
grea t . ”54 The Chinese government  seems to have reached the
same conclusion ,  a s evidenced by the  fact  tha t  the  leng thy
prison  t e rms wh ich  used  to be common for  those  found  viola t ing
reli giou s regulations have been replaced by other, less visible
means  of persecu t ion .55 The following is a representa tive list:
[S]om e of th e t ech n iques  now regu la r ly  employed  aga ins t
re ligiou s  be lie ve r s in clu de  ra id s on  ch u r ch es , oft en  co u p led
w i t h v iol ence , and  shor t  pe r iods  of det en tion  comb ine d w ith
ps ych ologica l a n d p h ysica l in tim ida tion  of th ose  de ta in ed . . . .
O th e r  t e ch n i q u e s i n cl u d e  c on s t a n t  s u r ve i ll ance  o f form er
re ligiou s  p r i sone r s ,  ou t s ide  v is i to r s  t o  ch u r ch  com p ou n d s , a n d
clergy goin g a bou t t h e ir  rou tin e w ork ; forced  re locat ion s of
influ en tia l cler gy; d isr u pt ion s b y loca l [po lice ] of r e l ig iou s
se rv ices  an d m eet ing s; pr ohib it i v e  fine s a n d ch ar ges  for “room
a n d  boa rd”  before  jailed  belie ver s m ay  re tu rn  hom e; ar bitr ar y
ch u r c h closing s; des tr uct ion of som e ch ur ch b uild in gs ;
confis cat ion  o f p r o pe r t y of bel ieve rs , in clu din g ev er yt h in g fr om
a n i m a ls  a n d  t oo ls  t o  B ib le s  and  hym na l s ;  fo rced  a t t enda nce  a t
“p o li t ic a l s t u d y ” c la s s e s; a n d  g e n e r a l h a r a s s m e n t .56
An exam ple of th e most  bru ta l rep res sion  t h a t  sometim es
occurs in Ch ina  is r ecorded  in t he t est imon y  of Rizvangu l
Uighur , an  et h n i c Uygur  re fugee fr om t he  Xian jian g Uygu r
Autonomous Region  of China  (former ly  Easte rn  Turk is tan),
before a  su bcom mit tee  hea r in g of t he U .S. H ouse  of
Represen ta tives held  in October 1997.57 Ms. Uighur ’s  t es t imony
describes the Chinese government’s Februar y 1997 crackdown
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58. S ee id . at *31.
59. S ee id .
60. S ee id .
61. Id .
62. S ee id .
63. S ee id .
64. S ee id .
65. S ee id . at *32.
66. S ee id .
67. S ee id .
on reli giou s a n d  cu l tu ra l act ivi t ie s of t he  ethn ic minor i ty
Uygurs in  her  hom e t own of Wu J ia. S he  expla ins  th at  Uygu rs
a re “born  Mus lim” an d t ha t it  is t h e ir  r elig iou s t r adi t ion  to
meet  t ogethe r  t o p ray dur ing  the Holy Ramadan .58 On  Februa ry
5, th e eve of Ramada n, thirty “prestigious religious leaders”
were  arr ested in Wu J ia by th e Chinese p olice.59 “Offended” by
the ar res ts , 600 youn g people gat her ed in  the  st reet s  and  began
walk ing toward  the  ci ty governme n t  to demand r ele ase  of th e
reli giou s leaders.60 On  their wa y, they were met by Chinese
pol ice an d par am ilitar y forces, who “violently disper sed [the]
crowd  us ing ele ct r ic clubs, wa ter  can on, an d t ear  gas  in t he
freezin g day.”61 The next d ay an  even lar ger demons t ra t ion  was
he ld  by  the Uygu rs . The Ch ines e police an d pa ra milit ar y forces
followed orders t o shoot int o the crowd, and  167 people were
killed .62 The police th en a rr ested  over 5,000 demonstrators,
includ ing th e elderly, youn g women, an d children .63 Dur ing
qu est ionin g, some of them were ridiculed and tortu red because
of their  reli gion .64 After  th e dem onst ra tion s, t he  Uygu rs were
sur prised  by the “patien ce” of th e Chinese i n  ca r ry ing  ou t  the
expected executions. Then it dawned on them  that  the Chinese
govern men t  was  wait ing for the United States t o extend Most
Fa vored Nat ion  s ta tus  to China .65 Afte r  M F N s ta tus  was
app roved by C ongr es s,  the loca l Ch in es e gover nmen t  open ly
executed seven Uygurs a n d sentenced twenty-thr ee others t o
t e rms rang ing  from five  years  to l ife  impr isonme n t .66 Those
sent enced to imprisonment  were pu t  on  an  open  t ruck  and
driven  th rou gh t own. F am ily an d frien ds followed close beh ind
to “say goodbye,” and th e Chinese soldiers  opened  fire, killin g
n ine Uygurs in  the crowd an d injur ing over twent y-five.67 Ms.
Uighur concluded h er  t e st imony by explaining that, as a
conse qu en ce of her  em ployme nt , sh e wa s n ot a llowed t o pra y, to
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68. S ee id . at *33.
69. In  Documen t  No. 6, t he  CCP and  the S ta t e  Counci l admit  t ha t  “the re  are
qu it e a  few p rob lem s in  th e im ple me nt at ion of t he  policy of fr eed om of r eligi ous
bel ief.  Cert ain  local  au th orit ies v iola te t he ci tiz ens ’ rig ht  to fr eedom  of rel igio us  beli ef.”
Docu m ent  No. 6 , r ep r in ted in  ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note  10, app . at 3 1 (emph asis
ad de d).
70. A Chinese repr esenta tive a t  the  February  7,  1992, meet ing of the  UN
Human  Rights Commission stat ed:
[Y]es, th ere w ere a  very sm all nu mber  of religiou s fol lowers  in  Ch ina  who
ha ve re ceive d p un ish me nt  for com mi tt in g cr im ina l an d adm inist ra tive
offenses. . .  . B u t  this  is n ot a  qu est ion con cer nin g r eligi on or  re ligiou s
bel ief.  Their  pun ishm ent  is a ju dicial que stion  but  absolu tely n o t  a
per secu tion  aga inst dissent. Their offenses included activities that
jeopardized na tion al se cur ity, fra ud, r ap e a nd  act ivi t ie s  t ha t  damaged  the
physica l and psychological health of the people.
ASIA WATCH  ‘93, supra  not e 20 , at  4 n .8; see also supra no t e ** and  accompanying
text .
71. F o r example, a recent  ar ticle in t he Beijin g Review claim s th at  an ti-Chin a
mot ions suppor t ed  by the  Un ited States  in  the  l ast  seven  sess ions  of  the UN Human
Righ t s Comm ission a re “wan ton in ter feren ce in Ch ina ’s int ern al a ffa i r s i n  a n a t t e m pt
to d is rup t  Ch ina ’s  s t abi li t y a nd cont ain  Chin a’s developmen t a nd fur th er ch an ge
China’s dev elop me nt  pa th  an d soci al s yst em  on t he  pret ext of hu ma n r ight s.” Yan shi,
supra  note 9, at  25.
72. On  Augu st  6, 19 97, C hin ese  re ligiou s figur es at ten ded a  forum  in Beijin g
to res pond t o allegat ions of religious s uppr ession ma de in  a  U .S . S t a t e  Depa r tmen t
repor t . Th e con se ns us  of th e for um  wa s t ha t t he  condition s ou tli ne d in  th e r epor t
were both “groun dless a nd a  ru th less in ter feren ce in Ch ina ’s int er n a l  a ff a irs.” Forum
on Ch in a’s Reli giou s Con di tion s, BE I J I N G RE V., Sept . 1, 1997, a t 15, available in 1997
WL 10063438. Bish op Ding G u a ngxun  wrote  tha t  t he S ta t e  Depa r tmen t  r epor t
exh ibi t s “America’s ment ality to pose as global policeman  an d world le ade r.” Id. a t
16. W u  Yu n g u i, research fellow with the Institute of Religion under the Chinese
a t t end reli giou s s chool, or  to go to mosques openly, and  was
forced to p ray secre t ly  at  home .68
Whether th e ab ove accounts a re exa mples  of reli giou s
per secut ion dir ected  by or t olera te d by t he  cent ra l gover n m en t ,
or  are instead insta nces of the regional an d local governmen ts
failing  to follow the policy directives of the  CCP, 69 th ere  is no
que st ion th at  in Ch ina  th e te rm  “religious freedom” carries
litt le i f any of t he  mean ing a t t r ibu ted  to i t  i n  t he  West .
Fu rt her more, it is  dist ur bing t ha t Ch ines e officials cont inu e to
deny th at  re ligious p er secu tion  exist s  in  China .70 I t  is  common
for  Chinese officials to explain awa y r e por t s of religious  righ ts
violati ons a s the product of U.S. imperialist objectives.71 The
view the Chinese government expresses publically is that  t he
Unit ed States is (1) ignorant of the true sit u a t ion  of reli giou s
freedom  in China  and /or (2) willing t o distort the facts in order
to gain political advan ta ge.72 It  is n ot t he p ur pose of th is
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Academy  of Social Sciences, argued that  the claims ma d e  in  t he  re por t “sh ow[] a  la ck
of bas ic knowle dge.” Id. at  18. Zh ao K ua ng wei,  dir ect or of t he  Cen te r for  Reli gion
Resea rch , c la imed  tha t  “in  Ch ina no indiv idual ha s been ar rested or sen tenced
because of r el ig ious be li ef .” Id . Zh ao explained tha t “[t]he persons involved in cases
which  certa in Amer icans  ma de us e of to accuse Ch ina  of ‘pers ecutin g religion’ are, in
fact , crim ina l offender s. Pu nish ing cr imin als h as n oth ing t o do with  religiou s belief.”
Id .
73. A vivid example of China’s need t o create a “false face” when confront ed by
embar rassm ent  or irr econcilable differen ces with  othe r coun tr ies is t he wa y it
att empted  to cover up the events at Ti an an men  Squ ar e. S ee Vause, supra  note 45,
a t  160 4-05  (“Th e Ch in es e Gover nm en t b oldl y de ni ed  th e e ss en ti al  fact s of t he
confron tat ion , despit e th e fact t ha t t hey h ad bee n r ecorded a nd pu blicized in gr a p h ic
deta il by t he  wor ld’s n ew s m ed ia .”).
74. S ee infra  Part  IV.
75. If those responsible for U.S. policy  ar e t o re spon d a ppr opr iat ely t o th e
problem of freed om of religion in  Chin a, th ey mu st unde rs ta nd  th e r ea son s for
China’s beh av ior . Mi su nd er st an din gs (o f mo ti ve a nd  cha ra cte r) on b oth  sid es  of th e
Pa cific have caused m uch of the curren t impas se.
76. S ee, e.g., Docum ent N o. 6, reprinted in  ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, supp.
a t  31 (“Par ty committees a nd governmen ts at  all levels must soberly realize the
complexity  and ser iousness of th ese  pr oblem s a nd  at ta ch gr ea t im por ta nce  to w ork
on  re ligion .”); Document N o. 19, repr inted in  ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, supp.
a t  37 (“ Those who expect to rely on adm inistra tive decrees or other coercive measures
to wipe  ou t  rel igious thin king a nd pr actices wit h one  blow are  . . . ent irely wr ong an d
will do n o sm al l h ar m. ”).
77. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘93, supra  note  20, at  1 (“[T]he Chin ese gov er n ment  has
s teadily t i gh t ened an d expanded its contr ol over all religious activity, out of concern
with  th e seem ingly explosive gr owth of Chr istia nit y with in its  border s, especia lly
among its  yout h.”); H U N T E R & CH A N, supra  no t e 11,  a t  71 (“According to the most
conser vat ive estimates Ch ristians h ave increased around sixfold [since 1949], while
popu lat ion  ha s s ligh tl y m or e t ha n d ou ble d.”).
78. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘93, supra  not e 20 , a t 1  n. 1 (“Ch in es e s ta ti st ics  a r e
notor iously ina ccura te a nd t her e app ear  to be n o precise de finitions  for ident ifying
re ligious beli eve rs .”); HU N T E R & CH A N, supra  note  11, at  66-71 (discussin g difficulties
Commen t  to a rgu e th at  th e official Chines e ver sion  of the fa ct s
is corr ect. It sh ould be clear  to an yone outside in format ion-
impoverished  Chin a it self th at , in n ear ly all m at ter s in volving
in terna t iona l conflict, t he Ch ines e govern men t p ain ts  a p ublic
facade th at  bear s little r esemb lan ce to r ea lity a s se en  by th e
Wester n  world.73 Inst ead, t he Comm ent  at tem pts to show tha t
the re a re  impor tan t  r easons74 under lying t he ways  in  wh ich
Chin a  dist or t s e vid en ce of reli giou s freedom when  confront ed by
U.S. pres sur e.75
It  shou ld be r emembered t ha t r eligious a ctivity in  Chin a is
an  i ssue of g rea t  impor t a n ce to th e Chinese governm ent .76
Desp ite  officia l s t a t is t ics , r eli giou s act ivity  in  China  i s g rowing
a t  a significant r at e.77 The re is  no wa y of accur at ely knowing
how ma ny r eligious  believer s t he re  ar e in C hin a t oday. 7 8  In
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i nvolved in obta inin g accur at e sta tist ics concernin g th e nu mber  of Christ ian s in
China) .
79. S ee H U N T E R & CH A N, supra  note 11, at  67.
80. S ee id . at 69.
81. R eligi ous  A f fa i rs  in  Ch ina, supra  note **, at 9-10.
82. S ee id .
83. In  1993 , Asia  W a t ch  pu t t he  nu mb er  of Cat holi cs in  Ch ina  at  12 m illion ,
and th e n um ber  of Pr ote st an ts  at  63 m illion . S ee AS I A WAT CH  ‘93, supra  no te 20 , a t
1 n.1.
84. S ee ASIA WATCH ‘93, supra  note  20, at  4 (outlinin g som e of t he  loca l
measu res  th at  ar e be in g t ak en  to “s top  th e ‘un ru ly gr owt h’ in  con ver sio ns ”).
85. S ee S. R es . 28 3, 1 04t h C on g. (1 996 ) (“To ex pr e s s t he  sense  of  the  Sena te
conce rn ing cre at ion of a  ne w pos iti on in  th e Wh ite  Hou se a s Se nior  Advis or on
Reli giou s Pe rs ecu ti on .”); S. C on . Re s. 7 1, 1 04t h C on g. (1 996 ) (“Expressing the Sense
of the Sena te with respect to the persecution of Christians worldwide.”). For a brief
dis cus sion  of the n atu re an d purpose of these resolutions, see  143 CO N G. RE C . S4879,
S4882 (da ily e d. M ay  21,  199 7) (s ta te me nt  of Se n.  Sp ect er ).
1990, a  sen ior  church  offi cia l in  Ch i na  r epor t ed tha t  t here  a re
ins t r uct ion s from th e CCP leader ship t ha t pu blished
asses smen t s of t he  number  of Christians mu st  be kept low.79 He
ma int ain ed t ha t s ta tis tics m ad e pu blic wer e on a ver age  a round
tw en ty-five percent of known figures.80 In  a  recen t  speech  by “a
res pons ible mem ber  of the S ta te Council’s Bu rea u  of Religiou s
Affair s,” it  wa s r ep or ted  tha t  Ch in a  has “over  100 m ill ion
people claiming belief in r eligion, wit h t he m ajorit y believing in
Buddhism an d Ta oism,”81 and  tha t cu r ren tly the re a re over  four
mill ion  Catholics and t en  mil lion  Protes tant s  in  China .82 At
least wit h  res pe ct  to the portion of Christian believers, i t  is  sa fe
to a s sume  that  th e rea l number  i s th ree to four  t imes  tha t
many .83 In  su m, t her e is a  significan t a nd  growin g religious
presence in ideologically atheist  China. The U.S. concern  is  tha t
these ind ividua ls a re s ufferin g rep res sion, som etim es br ut al,  a t
the hand of the government . China’s  concern  is  tha t  the “unru ly
growth ”84 of foreign  religions  mu st  be ha lted , with out  dividin g
the people so much tha t it  hinders China’s progress on  the
socia li st  pa th .
III. TH E  UN I T E D  ST A T E S ’ RE S P O N S E
 In  the  Unit e d  S t a tes , popu la r  and con gr es siona l an t i -China
sent iment  s t emming  from these  and other  human r igh t s abuses
in  China  ca m e  t o a h ead  in 199 6 wit h t he in tr oduct ion in
Congr ess of severa l resolutions dir ected at  th e problem of
reli giou s per secu t ion  ab road,8 5  and  in  1997 with  the
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86. H.R. 243 1, S . 77 2, 1 05t h C on g. (1 997 ).
87. S ee Rad io Fr ee Asia  Act of 1997, H .R. 2232, 105th Cong.; H.R. 2195, 105th
Cong. (1997 ) (prov idin g for ce rt ain  me as ur es t o incr ea se m oni torin g of  produc ts tha t
a re ma de  wit h fo rced labor); H .R. 96 7, 10 5t h C ong.  (1997 ) (proh ibit ing  th e u se of
United  Stat es funds to provide for th e part icipation of certa i n  Chin ese officials in
int er na tion a l conferences, programs, and a ctivities and providing that certain Chinese
officials shall be ineligible to receive visas and exclu ded from admission to the U nited
States); Fo rced  Abor t ion Condemn ation Act, H.R. 2570, 105th Cong. (1997); United
Sta tes -Ta iwan  Ant i-Ba llis ti c Mis sil e De fen se  Coope ra ti on Act , H .R. 2386, 105th  Cong.
(199 7); Communis t  China  Subsidy Redu ction Act of 1997, H .R. 2605, 105 th  Cong.;
H.R. 2647, 105t h Cong. (1997) (ens ur ing t ha t com mercial activities of the P eople’s
Libe ra tion  Arm y of Ch ina  or a ny  comm un ist Chinese m ilitary company in th e United
Stat es ar e m onit ore d a nd  ar e su bject  to t h e  a uthor it i es under  the  In te rna t iona l
Em er gen cy Econ omi c Pow er s Act ); Polit ical  Fr eed om in China  Act of 1997, H.R. 2358,
105th  Con g.; China Hu man  Rights a nd Dem ocracy Act of 1997, H.R. 2095, 105th
Cong.
88. S ee 143 CO N G. RE C . S4879, S4882 (daily ed. May 21, 1997) (introdu ction  of
bill in Sena te by Sen. Specte r); 143 CO N G. RE C . E996, E996-97 (daily ed. May 21,
1997) (intr oduction of bill in H ouse by Re p. Wolf).
89. 143 CO N G. RE C . H3 434 , H 343 4 (da ily e d. J un e 4,  199 7).
90. 143 CO N G. RE C . S4 879 , S4 882  (da ily e d. M ay  21,  199 7).
i n troduct ion  of the F reedom  From Religious P er se cut ion  Act 86
and pa ssa ge in  th e House of nine bills tha t can  be fairly term ed
“an t i -China” leg is la t ion .87 Th e F reedom  From Religiou s
Per secut ion Act  was  in t ro-duced in  Congress  on  May 20 an d 21,
1997, by Represen ta tive Fr an k  Wol f and  Sena tor  Ar l en
Specte r .88 Repr esen ta tive Wolf ha s des cribed  th e bill a s  “an
approach  th at  says we will no longer be silent wh en r egimes
te r ror i ze or a llow ter ror  aga ins t it s r eligious b eliever s.”89
Sena tor  Sp ect er  has s a id : “It  is  se r iou s and  it is  tou gh. Th is
leg is la t ion  commi t s t he  Un i ted States t o real action. There is no
more t ime for  ta lk .”90 The bil l is  a  clea r  sign  of congr es siona l
d is sa t isfact ion  wit h  the Clin ton  adm in is t ra t ion ’s p olicy of
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91. S ee Ran dall M ikk elsen , Clinton to Meet Leaders of China, Japan  (visited
Feb.  17, 1 998) < ht tp ://nt .exci te .com/webcrawler/re ute rs/971124/04.NEWS -
CLINT ON.h tm l> (reporting a conversation between Pr esident Clinton and Cana da’s
P r i m e Minister in which Clinton indicated that “there was n o  gu a r a n tee tha t we
would  ever see in Ch ina wh at we h ope to see in ter ms of hum an r ights, but  tha t th e
best wa y t o pr om ote  th at  wa s t hr ou gh  en ga gem en t”).
D u r in g t he  su mm it m eet ing s in  lat e Oct ober  1997 , bet wee n P re sid en t C lin ton  an d
Chinese Pr es ide nt  J ia ng  Zem i n , the two leaders proclaimed a “strat egic partn ership”
between  th e Un ited  Sta tes  an d Ch ina . S ee Ja mes P rzystu p & Robert A. Ma nn ing,
Clin ton ’s Ins cru ta ble C hi na  Poli cy, NAT’L RE V., Dec. 8, 1997, available in  1997 WL
8767358 (discussin g problem s with  th e an noun ced “stra tegic pa rt ner ship,” an d with
the issue of engagement). That  part nersh ip is an example of  t h e a dmin is t r a t ion ’s
poli cy of engagem ent  with  t he Ch inese  governm ent . As evidence of th e policy’s
success, propon ent s of engagem ent  point  t o  th e recent r elease of China’s top dissident,
Wei J i n g sh e n g. S ee Man n, supra note  55 (repor tin g th e adm inist ra tion’s claim th at
the re lea se  wa s “t he  cul mi na ti on  of an  int en sive  alt hou gh  lar gely  secr et  four -mon th
camp aign  by t he  Cli nt on  ad mi ni st ra ti on ”).
92. S ee, e.g., Human  R ight s  in  Ch ina  Hear ing, supra  no te * , a t  *3 ( sta temen t
of Rep re sen ta tiv e Ch ri st oph er  H. S mi th  (R-NJ ), Ch air ma n, S ub comm itt ee on
I n te rna t iona l Ope ra tion s a nd  Hu ma n R igh ts ) (“[T]he Cl int on a dm ini st ra tion  ha s
coddled dict a tors a s few have coddled before.”); 143 CO N G. RE C . H10054, H10056
(daily ed. Nov. 5, 1997) (sta tem ent  of Rep. Gilman ) (“Man y of us in t he Congr ess, and
many of the American people, believe that t he administra t ion is  soft-peddling issues
wh ich  we a s Am er ican s fee l st ron gly a bou t . .  . .”); Id . (sta te me nt  of Rep.  Solom on)
(“[T]h e Pr esi den t of t he  Un ite d St at es fe ll a ll over  him sel f las t w eek  roll ing  out  t he
red  car pet  for t his  Ch ine se d icta tor , an d offer ing  him  a b ag of goo d ie s  in  r e tu rn  fo r
a  couple of em pty p rom ises.”); Andre a St one, R eligi ous  Persecu tion  Bi ll O pp osed ,  USA
TODAY , Sept . 10, 1997, avai lab le  in  1997 WL 7013210 (quotin g  the s t a t emen t  o f Arne
Owens, Chr istian  Coalition spokes ma n, th at “th e Whi t e Hou se  is ‘followin g a  poli cy
of ap pe as em en t’ tow ar d t ra de  an d p olit ica l pa rt ne rs , lik e Ch in a”).
93. S ee 143 CO N G. RE C . H5 129  (da ily e d. J ul y 10 , 19 97).
94. F o r a  summary o f t he  ma jo r  chang es t o be offered in t he fort hcomin g
amendmen t  to the bill, see infra  no t e 122  and accompany ing  t ex t .
95. S ee 143 CO N G. RE C . H5 129  (da ily e d. J ul y 10 , 19 97).
“engagemen t” with  China ,91 wh ich is s een  by ma ny in  Congress
as appeasement of a  ru th le ss  au thor i ta r ian  r egime.92
The followin g su mm ar iz a tion of the purpose and ter ms of
t h e F ree dom F rom  Religious P ers ecut ion Act of 1997 is t aken
lar gely from commen ts of Rep res en ta t ive  Wolf m ade  before
Congress on J uly 10, 1997.93  Th e F reedom  From Religiou s
Per secut ion Act  of 1998 wil l d iffer  from the 1997 Act  in  some
respects, but  th e differen ces do not  significan t ly a ffect  the
conclusions of this Commen t. 94
The Act creates a new White House position—the  Di rector
of th e Office of Religiou s Per secu tion  Monit orin g.95 The Director
would be r espon sible for iss uin g an  an nu al r eport  det erm inin g
whet her  e ithe r  Ca tegory One or  Ca tegor y Tw o reli giou s
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96. S ee id .
97. Id .
98. Id .
99. Id .
100. S ee id .
101. S ee id .
102. S ee id .
103. S ee id .
104. S ee id .
105. Of Su da n, R epr ese nt at ive W olf st at ed t ha t “t he  per secu tion  occur r ing  there
is som e of t he  wor st  I’ve eve r s een . Sla ver y, for cible  conve rs ion , the use o f food as
a  weapon, tort ure, k idnappin g of children.” 143 CO N G. RE C . E996, E996-97 (daily ed.
per secut ion (as  d efi n ed by t he  bill) exist s in  a coun tr y.96
Ca tegor y One pe rse cut ion  in volve s t hose  case s in  wh ich
per secut ion is  “ongoing a nd w ides pr ea d” a nd i s ca r r ied  ou t  “by
the gover nm en t or  wit h t he  govern me nt ’s su ppor t.”97 Ca tegor y
Two encompasses  those  case s  i n  which  persecu t ion  i s not
ca r r ied ou t  w ith  governmen t  suppor t , bu t th e govern men t “fails
to ta ke ser ious an d sus ta ined efforts  t o elimina te t he
per secu tion .”98 For both categories, persecution is defined as
includ ing “killin g, ra pe,  imp risonm ent , abdu ction, tortu re,
enslavement  or forced m ass re set tle me nt .”99 Up on a  findin g of
reli giou s per secut ion by t he D irect or, imp osition of economic
sanct ions would  be au tom at ic.100 The san ctions could be wa ived
by th e Pr esident , with a  det a iled  wr it t en  exp la na t ion  to
Congress an d fort y-five days notice.101 Immedia te  sanct ion s
banning all exports t o foreign govern men t en tities would be
imposed on Category One count ries. 102 Ther e would also be a
ban on a ll goods , produ ct s,  and s er vices b ein g u se d t o facilita t e
re ligious  persecu t ion .103
Oth er  provisions of th e bill include t he following:104 t he
Unit ed S ta tes  would cu t  off a l l nonhumani ta r ian  a id to the
persecu t ing coun t ry; U .S . r epresen ta t ives  wou ld be ins t ruct ed
to vote a g a ins t  any mul t il a tera l  bank  loans  to the  pe rsecu t ing
count ry; the Pr esident would be inst ru cted to consider  reli giou s
per secut ion as  a  s ign ifican t  factor  i n deciding whethe r  t o
suppor t  a  coun t ry ’s  membership in  the Wor ld Trade
Organ iza t ion ; a  ban would be pla ced on visa s for a ll individ ua ls
who ca r ry ou t , orde r , or  over se e r eli giou s p er se cut ion ; vict im s of
reli giou s persecu t ion  would r eceive pr iorit y cons ider at ion in
asylum an d refugee pr oceedings; and  “imm ediat e  and tough”
sanct ions would be im posed aga ins t  Sudan .105 Pr oposed
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May 21,  199 7).
106. S ee infra  no t e 122  and accompany ing  t ex t .
107. S ee J an a Byr on, Regulatory Inqu isition: Congress Wants t o Punish T rading
Partners for R eligi ous  Pers ecut ion , TH E  E XPORT P R AC T IT I ON E R , Oct . 15, 1997, available
in  1997  WL 85 3072 1 (“For  th e pa st  few m ont hs, the fee l-good bill ha s been  ma king
i t s wa y t hr ou gh  Con gr es s a t a  good  clip  wit h s tr on g bi -pa rt isa n s up por t. ”).
108. S ee Pet er H ar din, Religious Persecution Bill Puts W olf into Spotlight:
Politicians, Church Group s Sp lit Over His Legis lat ion , RI C H M O N D TI M E S-DISPATCH ,
Oct . 12, 1997, avai lab le  in  1997 WL 7631763.
109. S ee Byron , supra  note 107.
110. Sen at or  Spec ter  r epor t ed  to the Senat e t hat “[t]he public response to these
p r og r a m s an d m y leg isla tiv e effor ts  to com bat  reli gious persecution has been
overwh elmin g. People from across the country h ave co n t ac t ed me  to u rge me  to
con t inue the fight . . . .” 143 CO N G. RE C . S4879, S4882 (daily ed. May 21, 1997). S ee
also 143 CO N G. RE C . H1 005 4, H 100 56 (d ai ly e d. N ov. 5 , 19 97) (s ta te me nt  of Rep.
Gilman) (“The Am erican  people ar e deeply concer ned a bout ou r r elat ionsh ip with
Chin a—all  of our colleagues receive le tt er s, p hon e ca lls,  an d ot he r com mu nica tion s
abou t  it.”); 143 CO N G. RE C . E1757, E1758 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1997) (statem ent of Rep.
Lee H.  Ha mi lt on ) (“The long list of witnesses h eard by th e committee i s  a  re flect ion
of the  s t rong  in t e re st  gene ra t ed  by th is  legislation among human rights groups and
re ligious an d p ub lic p olicy  or ga ni za ti on s n at ion wid e.”).
111. The sponsors of the bill  have organized several public “hearings” to r aise
awareness  of the r eligious persecut ion issue. G e n er a lly, several religious leaders
and/or hu ma n r ight s exper ts a re pr esen t t o test ify of persecution ar ound th e globe.
S ee, e.g., Ron Devlin , S pect er, M cHa le B at tle R eligiou s Per secu tion  in  All ent own
Churches, Legi sla tors  Back  B i ll  Tha t Wou ld  Pun i sh  Nations Pra ctici ng  In toler an ce,
ALLE N T O WN  MORNING CALL, Nov. 18, 199 7, available in  1997 WL 15100404 (hea r ing
held  at  Ceda r Cr est  Bible F ellowsh ip Ch ur ch); Klau s, supra  n o t e 30  (hear ing he ld a t
C a m p Hi ll U ni te d M et ho dis t C hu rch ).
112. Devl in , supra  no te  111  (qu oti ng  Se n.  Sp ect er ).
amendm en t s to t he  bill t ha t  wou ld a lt er  th e s t ruct ur e ju st
described are m entioned below.106
The Fr eedom  Fr om Religious Per secution Act has  received
consider able  a t t en t ion  and  in i t ia l  supp or t  in Congress.107 The
b ipar t isan bill ha s eigh ty-se ven cosponsors.108 Members of t he
In terna t iona l Relations Hum a n  Rights s ubcommitt ee voted
una nimously for a  favor able  rep or t  to the fu ll  In te rna t iona l
Rela t ion s comm ittee. 109 Pu blic sup port  for th e bill ha s also been
s t rong .110 I n  fact , th e spon sors  of the bill h ave coun ted  on pu blic
awareness  and support to help push the bill forward. 111 Sena tor
Specter  told about  two hundr ed  pe ople a t  a  pu bli c “hear in g” on
the issue of r eli giou s p er se cut ion  tha t  “‘[w]hen  we t ell th e
Amer ica n  public what’s going on,’ . . . ‘th ere will be a wave of
an ger  th at  will pr opel t his  bill righ t t hr ough  Congr ess .’”112
However, t he a ppr oach ta ken  by the bill ha s not been
un ivers ally received, a nd  th ere  is conside ra ble opposit ion to it s
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113. S ee Ha rdin , supra note 108 (“On th e surface, the goal of punis hin g foreign
tyr a n t s for religious persecution seems to be one that could unite liberals and
conservatives in W as hin gton . Bu t t he  me an s for  acco mplishing th e goal have stirred
controversy am ong  poli ti cia ns  from  bot h p ar ti es , bu sin es s le ad er s a nd  chu rch
gr ou ps .”).
114. John Shat tuck, Assistant  Secr e t ary of Sta te for Dem ocracy, Hu ma n Righ ts
and Labor, came before the Co m m it t ee on Int erna tional Relat ions on Septem ber 9,
1997 to give th e adm inist ra tion’s views on th e bill. S ee 143 CO N G. RE C . E1755, E1755
(daily ed. Sept . 16, 1997) (excerpt of st at emen t pla ced in  the R ecord by Rep.
Ha mi lt on ). Sha t tuck  ca l led  the b il l a  “b lun t  i n st rum e n t  t ha t  i s  more  l ike ly  to harm,
rat her  than  aid, victims of religious perse cution .” Id . He ga ve nin e rea sons, wh ich fall
i n to thr ee ma jor categories. First , the bi ll “runs  the  r isk  of  harming  vi ta l b il a te ra l
r e la t ions with key  a llies a nd r egiona l power s.” Id . Second, it  “crea tes a  confusing
bur eau crat ic str uctu re,” i d ., which wou ld “mar gina lize ” r a t he r  t han  “ma inst r eam” the
re ligious freed om iss ue. See id.  a t  E1756. Th ir d, it  “est ab lis he s a  de fa cto h ier ar chy
of hu ma n r ight s violat ions,” i d . at E1755, that  would comp rom ise  effort s “to p rom ote
the fu ll  r ange  of b asic  r ig h t s and funda men ta l fr ee do ms.” Id .
115. S ee, e.g., La wr en ce Good ri ch,  Congress Moves to Punish Rel igiou s Per secu tion
Wor ldwide, CHRIS T I AN  SC I E N CE  MONITOR , Sept . 25, 1997, avai lab le  in  1997 WL
2804206 (quoting the st atem en ts  of Rep.  Ma tt  Sa lm on (R-AZ), “I won der  . . . h ow
pol it i ca l th is offi ce ca n b ecom e . .  . . [F ]ore ign -policy con cerns are best  [left] with t he
secre t a ry of Stat e,” and S en. Cr aig Th oma s (R-WY), “We have  to be  hones t  and  say
i t ’s a s ta tu te  th at ’s lik ely  to c re at e m or e p ro ble ms  th an  it  solv es .”).
116. F o r criticisms of the bill  by six prominent hum an rights organizations, see
the l et te r  t o H on. Ben Gilman, Chair man , Intern ational Relations Comm ittee,
reprint ed in 143 CO N G. RE C . E1757, E1758 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1997). The lett er was
sen t by Hu ma n Righ ts Wa tch, P hysician s for Hu ma n Righ ts, Min nes ota Advoca te s for
Human  Rights, Amnesty Int erna tional/USA, the Robert F .  Kennedy Cen te r , and  the
J acob  Blau ste in In stit ut e for th e Advan cemen t of Hu ma n Righ ts. See id.  at E 1759.
T h e letter supports the overall purpose of the legislation but outlines sev er a l
criticisms ha ving to do wit h t he find ings of th e bill being too na rr ow, the  sepa ra t e
s t andards  of per secu tion  est ab lish ed b y th e bil l as  cre at ing  a p re fer en ce for  c er t a in
re ligious gr oup s, t he  defin iti on of p er secu tion  being t oo narrow, the creat ion of a “new
bureaucracy,” an d deficien cies in t he a sylum  an d re fugee p rovision s. See id.  at E 1758-
59.
117. F o r criticisms of the bill by the  National Council of the Churches of Christ
in  th e U SA (N CCC ), a  gr ou p of 3 3  P r otesta nt a nd Ort hodox denominations, see the
letter  from  Oliver Thomas, NCCC Special Counsel, to Members of the House
In te rna t iona l Relat ions Comm itt ee, re prin te d  in  143 CO N G. RE C . E1760, E1760-61
(daily ed. Se pt. 16 , 1997). Amon g oth er r eas ons, t h e NCCC opposes the bill  because
of its belie f tha t pu tt ing t he Office of Perse cution  M on i t or ing in the White House
would  ma ke  it s us cept ible  to p ar tis an  polit ical  pr ess ur e; t ha t sa nctions  “shou ld n ot
be an a utoma tic or first option”; that religious persecution should not be singled out
as more important  than  other forms of persecution for purp oses of U.S. refugee law;
and th at  stoppin g religious  pers ecution  in a noth er coun tr y re quires  “some  measu re
of hu milit y,” or consider at ion for differ ing cu ltu ra l valu es. Id. at E 1761.
Reli giou s groups tha t ha ve endorsed the Wolf-Specter bill include Pa t  Rober tson ’s
pa ssa ge from several fronts.113 The Clinton administr a tion  is
opposed to th e bill,114 as are some members of Congress.115
Oth er  groups opposed t o th e bill in clude  hu ma n r ight s
organizations,116 churches,117 and  the pu blic.118 Alt hough  no one
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Virginia-based Chr istia n Coa lition , th e U.S . Ca th olic Con fer en ce, t he  Arch dioces e of
New York , the  Nat iona l Association of Evangelicals, and the Southern Bapt ist
Conven t ion . S ee Ha rdin , supra  note 108.
118. S ee, e.g., Dan iel Gr iswold, Opi ni on: T rad e Cu ts C an ’t Fi gh t Per secu tion , SALT
LAKE TR I B U N E, Sept . 28, 1997, avai lab le  in  1997 WL 3427 880 (offer ing  var ious
a rgumen t s for why the Wolf-Specter bill will fail) (Mr. Grisw old is director of Trade
and Imm igra tion  stu dies a t t he Ca to In stit ut e); Philip  Pet ers , Pers ecut ion  and
Redem ption , WA S H IN G TON  TI M E S, Sept . 25, 1997, avai lab le  in  1997 WL 3684592
(notin g t h a t  the Wolf-Specter bill  “is so laden with new economic sanctions and
foreign  policy prescriptions tha t  i t  ha s dr aw n . .  . opp osit ion .  . . a nd  is d est ine d for
prolonged de ba te ”).
119. 143 CO N G. RE C . E1 755,  E1 755 (d ail y ed . Se pt . 16, 1 997) (e xcer pt  of
s t a t emen t  pla ced  in  th e Re cor d b y Re p. H am ilt on ).
120. Hard in , supra  note 108.
121. Griswold, supra  not e 118. 
122. S ee How You  Can H elp Pass H.R. 2431  (visited Mar. 24, 1998)
<htt p://www.house.gov/wolf/free/youcan .htm >. The significant  chan ges to be offered  in
the am endm ent  include  th e following:
Movemen t of th e Office  of Relig ious  Pe rs ecu tion  Mon itoring from  th e Whit e
House to  the  S ta te  Depa r tmen t. Broaden ing o f t he  P residen t ’s  au thor i ty to
in  any of t he  groups jus t  ment ioned wants to be seen  as
oppos ing freedom  of religion, several “flaws” have been point ed
out  in  th e legisla tion . One r epea ted  concern  is t ha t t he b ill may
actua l ly do more har m th an good. Assistant Secretary of State
J o h n S h att uck  ha s st at ed t ha t “th e bill could s er iously h ar m
the ver y peop le i t  se ek s t o help . . . . [W]e fear r eprisa ls by
re pr ess ive governments a gainst victims, as well a s  an  end  to
any dialogue on religious fr eedom , in  ret a lia t ion  for  the
sanct ions th at  th e bill wou ld a ut oma tica lly imp ose.”119 The
Nat iona l Coun cil of Chu rch es of Chr ist  in t he  US A (NCCC) h as
sa id th at , based  on its  experience working wit h per secuted
religiou s groups, it believes th e bill “would do more ha rm  th an
good t o t he  very p eople it  is de sign ed t o help .”120 Another
comme n t a tor  ha s pointed out  th at  “[t]ypically, governm ent s
tha t  ar e au thor i t a r ian  enough  to engage in  rel ig ious
pers ecut ion are t he le ast  pol it ica lly  se nsi t ive  to out side
economic pressure. The most likely result is that  sanctions will
s t ok e th e zeal of an ti-Western , an ti-J ud eo-Chris tia n
militan ts.”121
In  res pons e to t hes e an d oth er concer ns  abou t t he b ill’s
effectiveness, th e sponsors h ave agr eed to a set  of chan ges
which  it is expected will be i nt roduced dur ing  the House
In terna t iona l Relations Comm ittee full committ ee ma rk up,  due
to occur Ma rch 25, 1998.122 While the changes that  ar e proposed
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waive  th e s an cti on s if i t ca n b e ce rt ifie d  t h a t doing so would “advance the
objectives of the a ct. ”Narr owing of the p rovision  wh ich b an s t he  exp ort  of
pers ecution -facilitatin g pr odu cts . Au th ori za ti on of t he  Dir ect or of t he  Office
of Rel igio us  Pe rs ecu ti on  Mon it or in g t o h old p ub lic h ea ri ng s. C it at ion  of th e
De cl a r ation  of In dep en den ce a nd  U.S . Con st itu tion  in t he  “Fin din gs” se ction
of th e bill.
Agr eed  Changes to H.R . 2431 (vi s it ed  Mar . 24, 1998) <http://www.house.gov/wolf/free/
c ha n g es .h t m > . Mor e in for m a t i on  a bout t he pr oposed am endm ent s to t he bill, a s well
as the m ost recent  text a vailable, can be  foun d on Repr esen ta tive Wolf ’s  webs ite  a t
Congressman  Frank R . Wolf:  Proudly Serving Virginia’s 10th District  (vi si t ed  Mar .
30, 1998) <htt p://www.house.gov/wolf/>.
123. S ee infra  Part  IV.
124. S ee supra  no t e 87 and  accompanying t ext .
125. On  the i mpor ta nce of un der sta ndin g Chin a’s political, ph ilosophica l, an d
re ligious history, one noted Sinologist of almost a centur y ago wrote:
Chin a  is  not an  emp ire of a da y. . . . It is t her efore imp ossible th orough ly
address  some impor tan t  concerns and undoubted ly  improve the
overa ll effect ivenes s of th e bill, th e cha nges  do litt le, if
any th ing, t o r e duce t he  nega tive  imp act  th at  th e bill will h ave
on Chines e-U.S. relations in  genera l and  religiou s fr eedom
dia logue s pecifically.
While  criticisms of the bill’s operat ion or application can be
add ress ed by a men dm en ts of t he type contem pla ted  by its
sponsors, those  concerns which  point  to th e fundam ental
inadvisability of imposin g U.S.  reli giou s pol icy on  other  na t ion s
cannot  be answered by an am endment t o the bill . These
fundamenta l concerns a re  pa r t i cu la r ly  di st ressing when  viewed
in  light of the un ique cultura l, historical, and political rea lities
in Chin a t ha t a ffect its per ception of th e West. 123
As will be shown in m ore deta il below, if th e Wolf-Specter
bill (in either  1997 or 1998 it e ration) and th e nine pieces of
an t i -China  legisla t ion 1 24 ar e en act ed, t hey w ill alm ost s ur ely
damage an  a l ready s t ra ined re la t ionsh ip  be tween  the  U n it ed
Sta tes  and  China, foreclos e m ea nin gfu l d ia logu e on  reli giou s
freedom  issue s betw een t he t wo count ries, a nd cau se China, if
any th ing , to t igh ten  it s gr ip  on the m ea ger  freedom  of reli gion
tha t currently exists.
IV. UN D E R S T A N D I N G  CH I N A
 Before t u r n in g t o a  bett er U.S. r esponse t o the pr oblem of
reli giou s freed om in  Chin a, it  is first  neces sa ry t o lay out  in
some det ail t he h ist orical r eas ons u nd erlyin g Chin a’s in evita ble
res is t ance to a  Wol f-Specte r -type  approach .125 The pr emise of
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t o comprehen d her polity, laws and inst itutions, and to appra i se them a t
th eir  right valu e, un les s on e ca n con sid er  th em  in  th e lig ht  of th eir  cla ss ica l
origin  a n d historical development[,] . . . and this tr uth  applies to her
pol it i ca l principles on the point of religions.
J . J . M. DE  GROOT, SECTARIANISM AND RE L I G I O U S  P E R S E C U T IO N  I N  CH I N A 4 (19 03).
126. 143 CO N G. RE C . H100 54, H1 0059 (da ily ed. Nov. 5, 1997). Re p. H am ilt on
opposed th e n ine  pie ces of a nt i-Ch ina  legis lat ion m en tion ed supra ,  not e  87 , s aying
tha t  passa ge would set “back U.S.-China  re la t ions and  do harm to  impor tan t
Ame ri can  int ere sts .” Id . at H 10058.
127. C. K. YA N G, RE L I G IO N  I N  CH I N E S E  SOCIETY  3-4 (1 961 ).
128. S ee i d . at  4 (citing  a  Ch ina  schola r  who s ta ted  tha t  “[ t ]he  Chinese  . .  . a re
no t a people for wh om re ligious idea s an d activit ies const itu te  a n  a ll -impor t an t  and
th i s d iscuss ion  is  t ha t  a  cor rect  underst an ding of China ’s view
of the  pr oblem m us t p re cede form ula tion  of U.S. policy.
Representative Lee Hamilton (R-IN), has said:
[T]h e  r e l a t i on s h i p  w i t h  C h in a . . .  i s  a  t e r r ib ly  complex
re l a t ionsh ip . It  is on e of t h e m ost  difficu lt for eig n  poli cy
r e l a t i on s h i p s  in  the  wor ld  to  ma nage ,  even  in  th e  bes t  o f t imes .
T h e r e l a t ionsh ip  o f t en  mak e s  us  un comfor t ab le .  Ch ina  a s  a
co u n t r y has  m a n y  fa u l t s  and  d oes  man y  th ings  we  do  no t  l i ke .
T h e  tw o coun tr ies  h av e va st ly d iffer en t p er sp ect ives  on  a
wh ole h ost  of pr oble m s . . . .126
This  pa r t  of the Commen t  out lines  some of th e “vas tly
diffe ren t  pe r sp ect ive s” h eld  by t he Chin es e gover nmen t , wh ich
will impact the success of the Wolf-Specter bill , if it  is enacted.
It  discu sses  th e his tor y of relig ion  in  Ch ina , t he  ant i -
imp er ia li sm/an t i -Chr is t ian  movements  of the  n ine teen th  and
ea r ly twent ieth centu ries, and  th e Chinese view of law an d
proper  conduct . Th is  discu ss ion  wil l show th at  th e Wolf-Specter
bill can  only ser ve to wea ken  U.S.-Ch ines e re lat ions, wit h lit tle
hope  of im pr ovin g r eli giou s fr eedom .
A. Th e History of Religious Freedom in Ch ina
 The role of religion  in China ’s long history ha s been  much
debated. The  fact t ha t t her e ha s been  no “str ong, cent ra lly
orga n ized re ligion” in m ost p er iods of Chin ese h ist ory, n o
“social an d political domina nce by a r eligious doctrine and a
power fu l pr iest hood,” and in st ead  a “seem ingly a gnost ic
Confucia n  tr ad ition  of secula r or th odoxy,”127 has led many
Weste rn sch ola r s t o view r eli gion  as a  rela t ive ly u n im por tan t
factor  in Ch ine se s ociety.128 Bu t  the t ru th  i s tha t  the
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absorb ing par t of life” (quotin g DERK  BODDE , CH I N A 18-21 (1951 ))); see also id.  a t  5
(citing a C hi na  sch ola r w ho s ta te d t ha t “Ch in a i s a  cou n t ry without religion and t he
Chinese are a people who are not bound by religious su per s t it i ons” (quo t ing  Hu  Sh ih ,
“Ming Chiao” (The Doctrine of Names), in  H U  SH I H  WE N  TS’U N  91 (1 928 ))).
129. F o r one scholar  who ha s conclusively sh own th e “stron g an d per vasiv e
in flu en ce of religion in Chinese society,” see the a uth o r it a t i ve work of C. K. Yang.
YA N G, supra  note 127, at  1-27.
130. DA N IE L L. OV E RM YE R , RE L I GI O N S O F  CH I N A 25 (1 986 ).
131. S ee id. at 25-27.
132. S ee id . at 27.
133. S ee id .
134. S ee Kolodner , supra  note 8, at  415.
135. S ee id . at 415 n.34 (indicating the deb a t e over  th e r elig iou s/p hi losop hi cal
e lemen t s of Con fuci an ism ).
136. S ee id . at 415.
development  of religion in Ch ina , alt hou gh d issim ilar  i n  some
wa ys to r eli gion  in  the We st , h as b een  a  sign ifica n t  factor
th rou ghou t Ch ine se h ist ory.129
Dur ing China’s prehistory, it  appears th at t he Chinese
“already venerated their ancestors, tried to discover their
[ancestors’] will through divination, and m ade offerings to
powers  of na tu re.”130 Th is  pr act ice of t he in digen ous r eli gion
cont inued and  expanded  th rou g h ou t  th e Sha ng (B.C.E. 1500-
1040) and Zhou (B.C.E. 1040-256) periods.1 3 1  Then , as  a r esu lt
of th e long pe riod of civil war  th at  bega n in t he e igh th  cen tu ry
B.C.E ., some of the in tell ect ua ls  bega n  to dou bt  the p ower  of
the gods and spirits.132 Confucius (B.C.E. 551-479) was the first
well-known  rep res en ta t ive  of the n ew ph ilos oph y wh ich
concen t r a ted more on  human bein gs  and les s on  the wor ld  of
spirits.133 Con fucia n  belie fs p er mea ted  Ch in es e s ociet y for
hundr eds of years  following Confucius’ deat h, and in  the  second
cen tu ry B.C.E. Confu cian ism  becam e st at e ort hodoxy.134 While
t h e focus  of Confucian though t  is  on  the  ea r th  r a ther  t ha n  t he
heavens, ther e a re s ign ifica nt  reli giou s a sp ect s t o Con fucian
th ought a nd pr actice.135
T h e two other  religious  movem ent s of ma jor imp act  in
ancien t  Ch in a  were Daoism and Budd hism. Da oism,  an
in digen ous Ch in es e r eli gion  t h a t  de velope d a lon g bot h
ph ilosophica l and r eli giou s l in es , is  ba se d on  the t ea chin gs  of
the T a o T e Ching and Chuang Tzu —books  compiled s omet ime
in  th e la tt er  pa rt  of the  Chou  Dyn as ty (ca. 1050-256 B.C .E .).136
Confucian ism  an d Da oism r epr esen t t he  tw o sur viving
embodimen ts  of China ’s “own” r eli giou s a nd p h ilos oph ica l
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137. Br it s ch , supra  note 47, at  348.
138. S ee Kolodner , supra  note 8, at  415.
139. S ee id .
140. S ee id .
141. S ee id . at 415-16.
142. S ee id . at 416.
143. S ee Human  R ight s  in  Ch ina  Hear ing, supra  not e *, a t *3 0-*33  (t e s t imony
of Riz va ng ul  Ui gh ur ).
144. S ee Kolodner , supra  note 8, at  416.
145. S ee Brit sch, supra  note 47, at  348-49.
146. S ee id . at 348.
147. S ee OV E RM E YE R , supra  note 130, at  55.
148. S ee id .
149. S ee Kolodner , supra  note 8, at  416.
150. S ee OV E RM E YE R , supra  note 130, at  55.
her itage.  However ,  a s one  au thor  h a s noted , “[s ]ince  ancien t
times, bu t  pa r t icu la r ly s in ce t he Ta ng Dynast y (A.D.  618 -906 ),
Chin a  has  pl ayed hos t  t o many r eligions.”137 Buddhism was the
first  foreign  r eligion to become es ta blish ed in  Chin a. 138 I t  was
in t roduced by B udd his t  mer chant s from India in the first
cen tu ry A.D, and  soon becam e th e st at e re ligion  of Nor the rn
Chin a  du r ing the  Pe r iod  of D isun ity (220 -589  A.D.),  rea chin g its
apex in th e Tan g Dynast y (618-907 A.D.).139 I n  t he seven th
cen tu ry A.D., Buddh ism wa s int roduced int o Tibet by a n I nd ian
monk .1 4 0 There, Buddhism merged with a na tive animist
t r ad it i on  known as Bon, a nd  developed  int o Tan tr ic Budd his m,
a very different religion from Chinese Buddhism.141
Around the  mid-e igh th  cen tury A.D., Islam wa s int roduced
in to Cent r al Asia by merchant s along the Silk Road.142 The
eth nic Uygu r  pe ople of t he Xin jia ng Uygu r  Autonomous Region
of China  remain  conver ted  to the  Mus lim fa i th  to th i s day.143
Chr is t ian ity , th e oth er m ajor r eligion in Ch ina  today, did
not  r e a ch  C hina’s shores  un til mu ch later ,144 and  desp it e  it s
lon g his tor y th ere , it  has never been “nat ura lized” as  Buddhism
has. 145 Chr is t ian ity  was first  int rodu ced to Ch ina  by Nes tor ian
missiona ries  in 63 5 A.D.,146 but  it d id n ot la st lon g.147 Lat er , a
sm al l num ber of Italian Cat holic missionar ies established
churches in Chi n a  i n  the th irteenth a nd fourt eenth centuries,
bu t th ey soon disa ppea red  as  well.148 The fi r st  Chr ist i an
act ivity in  China  wit h  an y per ma nen ce began  with  th e J esu its
in  th e l a te  sixt een th  cen tu ry,149 but  th ey were dr iven out wh en
a  pope ordered  th em  to condemn ancestor worship.150 The
Prote st an t s did not a rr ive unt il 1807 and sett led m ostly in  th e
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151. S ee Kolodner , supra  note 8, at  416.
152. S ee Brit sch, supra  note  47, at  348 (“It is common  for outs iders  [erron eously]
to view this stat e of affairs as repr esenting a  significant chan ge from earlier times,
the im plica tion  bein g th at  som e for m of m oder n, W est er n-s tyl e r eligi ous  fre edom
existed pr ior  to 1 949 .”).
153. S ee Kim-Kwon g Cha n, A Chin ese Perspective on th e Interpretation of the
Chinese Government’s Religious  Poli cy, in  ALL UNDER H EAVE N : CH I N E S E  TRADITION
A N D CH R I S TI A N  LI F E  I N  TH E  P EOPLE ’S  RE P U B L IC  O F  CH I N A 38, 3 8 (199 2); see also YA N G,
supra  no t e 127 , a t  180 (“[T]he ru ling group, particularly th e Confucians, tr ied to exert
a  sys te ma tic con tr ol over  re ligiou s for ces s o th at  t h e y w ou ld  serve exc lus ively the
ends  of th e e st ab lis he d p owe r s tr uct ur e.”).
154. YA N G, supra  note 127, at  180.
155. B r it s ch , supra  no t e 47,  a t  348 (quo t ing  J im  Stewar t  i n  TH E  CHIN A MI S S IO N
H ANDBOOK: A P O R TR AI T  OF  CHINA AND IT S  CHURCH  34 (J on at ha n C ha o ed ., 1 989 )).
156. S ee supra  Part  II.
157. S ee Kolodner , supra  note 8, at  417.
158. S ee id .
Trea ty Ports.151 China’s long histor y of involvemen t with  th ese
foreign  reli gion s h as h a d  a  h uge impact on its a tt itudes  toward
re ligion t oday.
Rest r ict ion s on re ligious libert y did n ot begin  with  th e
founding of the P eople’s Rep ublic of China  (wha t t he CC P ca lls
“Liber at ion”) in 1949.152 Religious affairs h a v e been controlled
by the Chin es e a u thor it ies  since th e Tan g Dynast y (618-906
A.D.). 153 His tor ically, th e tr ad itiona l  governmen t  “t r ied to
demons t r a t e its master y over supernatu ral forces, . . . imposed
a  monopoly over certain ritu als and interpr et a t ions  of re ligious
mat ters, . . . exer ted  adm in is t ra t ive  cont rol over  reli giou s
orga niza t ion s a n d  t he priest hood, and . . . tried t o prevent  an d
suppress  th e developmen t  of het er odox religiou s m ovemen ts .”154
As one commentat or has noted, “‘In  imper ia l C h in a , t he  st a t e
ass um ed a r ight  of sovereign ty over all aspects of its subjects’
lives. There was no separation of religion and sta te  as
under st ood in t he  West , neit he r in  th eory n or in  pr act ice, an d
the Chines e people have never  ques t ion ed  the s over eign ty of
th e st at e.’”155
The moder n CCP r estr ictions on r eligion m ent ioned ear lier
in  th i s Comment156 have long been used by the Confucianist
elite  to rep res s r eli gion .157 F or  exam ple, du rin g th e Qin g
Dynasty (A.D.  1644-1912), t he Confucia n is t s r egu la ted  reli gion
through th e Ministr y of Rites (Li Bu), which was  organ ized in to
severa l dep a rtmen ts t o de a l sep ara tely  wit h  the va r iou s
reli giou s den omin at ions opera t ing in Ch ina  a t  t he t ime .158 One
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159. YA N G, supra  note 127, at  183.
160. Kolodner,  supra  n ote 8, at  417 (sum ma rizing YA N G, supra  note 127, at  183-
87).
161. S ee supra  no t e 69 and  accompanying t ext .
162. On  Augu st  11, 1 746,  th e em per or of China  gave  to the  S ta te Counc il  an
order  calling for increased enforcement  of the pr ohib iti on a gai ns t t he  pr act ice of
Chr istia nit y. S ee DE  GROOT, supra  note 125, at 280-81. The or der r equir ed th at  all
European leaders of the illegal Christian groups be arrested, s en t  t o Kwang tung,  and
then , w it h in a  fixed per iod of time , sen t ba ck to t heir  count ries  of origin. See id.  a t
281. However , when  th e order  rea ched local a ut horiti es  in  one  pr ovin ce, t he  loca l
government  official, perhaps a ssumin g that  he was giving effect t o t he  spi r it  o f t he
law over its letter,  promptly imprisoned five Spanish m issi ona ri es,  incl ud ing  one
Bishop, and h ad th em cruelly tortu red. The five men were th en  sen tenced  to dea th
by th e Gover nor  of the p rovin ce, an d lat er e xecut ed. See id.
163. Kolodner,  supra  note 8, at  416.
164. DE  GROOT, supra  note 125, at  4.
of the laws restricting religious activity  at  th e time p rovided
t h a t  “[t ]hose wh o ma ke p riva te a ppea l to H eave n [i.e., wors hip
outside of officially recognized chan nels] . . . sha ll be punish ed
with  eigh ty s t rokes  of the s t ick .”1 5 9  These la ws also “rest ricted
the number  of monks  and nuns w h o could  legally en gage in
r eli giou s act ivities , p roh ibi t ed  p r iv a t e con s t r u ct i on  of
tem ples . . ., a nd ca lled for decapita tion of an yone who crea ted
or dis tr ibu te d h er et ical r eligious  lite ra tu re .”160
It  i s i nt e res t ing to note  tha t t he difficult y Chin a cu rr ent ly
faces in t ryin g to lim it over -enforcem en t of its  re ligious  policy
by local au th orit ies161 wa s exp er ien ced h ist orically b y th e
Chinese govern men t a s far ba ck as t he m id-eight eent h
ce n t u r y.1 6 2  B u t  Ch in a’s d ifficu lt y in  cont r olling loca l
enforcement  of cen t ra l l aw notwiths tand ing , t he  cen t ra l
government  has never  been  neu t ra l, much less friendly, towar d
nonorth odox religions.
In  su m, “official a n t ipa thy”163 towa rd  religion d id n ot begin
with  Lib er a t ion  in  194 9, bu t  has been  a  pa r t  of Chinese h is tory
for  a lmos t  two thousand yea r s . In  1901 , De Groot ,  a  noted
Chin a  schola r , warned  tha t  “the h is tory of reli giou s p er se cut ion
in  Chin a . . . is  a lm ost  the h is tory of h er  reli gion s
th em selves .”164
B. Th e Anti-Im perialism /  Anti-Christian Movements
 Toda y, one of China ’s grea te s t  concerns abou t  “foreign ”
reli gion s is th e potent ial it per ceives for foreign  dom ina t ion ,  or
“infiltr a t ion .” As  one  commenta tor  has  noted , “[t ]h i s concern  is
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ C A R- F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
563] FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN CHINA 591
165. Vause, supra  no te  45,  at  160 1 (em ph as is a dd ed ).
166. Docu m ent  No. 6 , reprinted in  AS IA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10, app. a t 30
(emph asis  ad de d).
167. S ee id .
168. The his tor y th at  follows  is t ak en  lar gely  from  J ESSIE  GRE GOR Y LUTZ,
CH I N E S E  P O L I TI C S  AN D CH R I S TI A N  MI S S IO N S: TH E  ANTI -CH R I S TI A N  MOVEMENTS OF  1920-
28, at  1-26  (198 8).
rooted de ep ly in  the b it t er  h is tory of Ch in a’s e a r lie r  contact s
with  th e West wh en t he in fluence of foreign missionar ies was
viewed as a n  in tegr a l el em en t  in  the We st er n  dom in a t ion  and
resul t ing  na t iona l  hu m iliation of China .”165
Curren t  CCP  policy dire ctives still in voke t he  me mor y of
n ine t een th an d ear ly twent ieth  cent ur y imp eria lism . For Ch ina ,
the str uggle again st  th e imp eria list  West  is a  cur ren t, ongoin g
bat tle, complicat ed by t he  fa ct  t h a t  the ques t ion  of reli gion  has
been in ext r ica bly  en twined  for  the Chines e with West ern
pol it ica l domina tion. A CCP inter na l docum ent  issued  Februa ry
5, 1991, states: “We must realize  th a t  hostile forces  beyon d ou r
borders  have all a long be en  using r eli gion  as a n  im por tan t
means to car ry ou t  their  st r a tegy  of br in gin g a bou t  ‘peacefu l
evolu t ion ’ in our count ry. They have continuously engaged  in
in fi lt ra ti on  an d dis ru pt ive act ivitie s a gain st  us .”166 Unlike oth er
publ ica t ions mean t  for  genera l d is semina t ion  to the Chinese
pu blic and  the in terna t iona l a u dience, this docum ent wa s
issued  to “Par ty  Commit tees  and people’s governmen ts of t he
va r iou s provinces” and other government  bodies.167 The t one of
the document  is  frank , open ,  and ser iou s.  Th er e is  none of t he
pos tu r ing or  pu bli c rhet or ic (or  pr opagan da) th at  perva des
official sta tem ent s mea nt  to be ma de widely public. It seem s
rea sonable to conclude t ha t t he CCP gen uinely fears
“in fi lt r a t ion” of foreign  polit ica l powers t h rough  the m ea ns of
reli gion . As r idiculous as th at m ay sound to the United Sta tes,
with  its  fait h in  free t ra de a nd  free e xch a n ge of ideas and
informat ion, it is a rea l concern  for t he Ch inese governm ent .
Ant i -Imper ia li sm/an t i -Chr is t ian  sen tim ent  first  ar ose in
Ch ina  in  the  ninet een th  cen tu ry. To unders tand those  power fu l
influences (still pr esen t t oday), some h ist orical ba ckgrou nd  is
ne cessa ry:168
C h r i s ti a n it y h a d  b e e n  o ff ic ia l ly  p r o sc r ib e d  a s  h e t e r o d ox  in
1724  an d eva ng elism  dec la red  i l l ega l . Dur ing  the  ea r ly  19 th
ce n t u r y a  h a l f d o ze n  o r  so  P r ot e s t a n t  m is s io n a r i e s  t r i e d ,
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171. S ee id . at 11.
172. Id .
173. Id . at 12.
174. Id .
ne ver th ele s s , t o sp re ad  th e w ord  al on g t h e coa st al  frin ges  of
C h in a  an d a  la rg er  n u m ber  of Ca t h o li c p r i e s t s  worked
u n d e rg r ou n d  in  th e  in te r io r .  In  th e  mid-19 th  c en t u ry  t r ea t i e s ,
W e st e r n er s  de m an de d a n d ob ta in ed  bot h  t h e  r ig h t  t o
pr oselytize  in  Ch ina  and  a  gua ran tee  o f t o l e ra t ion  for  Ch in ese
conv er ts . . . .
These  mis s iona ry  ven tu res  m e t  w it h  con s id e ra b le  a n d
incr ea sin g hos t i l it y .  Dur ing  th e  pe r iod  be tween  t h e 1 86 0s  a n d
t h e 1880s ,  hundr eds  o f s ep a r a te  an d loca lized  at ta cks  on
miss ion s  a n d  C h i n e s e  co n v e r t s  er u p t e d .  . .  . C h i n e s e  a im e d  t o
p ro tec t  t h e ir  h e r it a g e fr om  ext er n al  cont am in at ion  a n d  t o d e n y
th e fore ign er s pow er  in C hin a. 169
The l at e r  Ant i-Christ ian Movemen ts of the 1920s r eitera ted
many cr i ti ci sms  of t he  n ine t een th  cen tu ry,  wi th the differ en ce
tha t  t h e young intellectua ls respons ible for th e movement s
were  now t rying to des t roy , r a t her  th an  sa lvage, t he old
orth odoxies.170 Du rin g th e Ant i-Chr ist ian  Moveme nt s, Ch i na
was r easses s ing both  Western and Chinese traditions.171 “[F ]ew
could find a  role for Ch ris tia nit y in moder n izing Ch ina ; r a the r,
th ey came to v iew Chr is t ian  miss ions  as a  dete r ren t  to na t iona l
s t r ength  and  un ity .”172 The  cam pa ign a gain st  Christ ianity wa s
“built  on  a  long  an t i-Chr is t ian  t rad it ion .”173  A “const an t t hem e”
of the  Moveme nt  wa s “th e a rr ogan ce of the We st er ne r.”174
In  de scr ibing t he r ea son s for  th e brea kdow n in  rela t ion s
between  th e Ch ine se a nd  th e foreign  mis siona rie s, P rofes sor
Lutz has said:
W h a t  h a s  b e en  c a ll ed  t h e  la w  o f c u lt u r a l diffr act ion
ope ra t ed  in  th e m ee tin g of C h in e s e a n d  W es t er n e r ; e a ch  w a s
a t t u ned  to  the  v i ews  and  va lues  o f h i s  own  na t iona l s , b u t
m u c h l es s  s en s i t iv e  t o t h e  r e a ct i on s of th e oth er  side . See ing
Chinese  socie ty t h r ou g h  h is  ow n  cu l t u r a l p r is m , a  m i s si on a r y
migh t  n ot b e a wa re  th at  h is a ction s off en d e d ,  t h a t  h i s v er y
p r es en ce  could  b e  in t e r p r e t e d  a s a n  i n s u lt .  E ve n  w h e n  p r o te s t s
b r ou g h t Ch in es e d iss at isfa ction  forc ib ly  to h is a tt en tion , h e
could  find  jus tificat ion in  th e sa nct ity of h is m issio n  t o s p r ea d
t h e gospe l.  . .  . Un der  th e  c ir cum s tan ces , t he  poss ib i li t i e s for
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175. Id . at  12-1 3 (foot no te s om it te d).
176. S ee id . at 13.
177. S ee id . at 13-14. Some assum ed that  the foreigners were attr acted by  t he
“comforta ble easy life” that  they saw th e missionaries living (in comparis on  w it h  the
l iv ing sta nda rd of m ost Ch ines e). See id.  a t  14.  Othe r s  a ssumed tha t  t he m i s si on a r ies
foun d grea ter  finan cial rewa rd in  China t han  their t alents would ha ve brought th em
in  th e West . See id.  Toda y t he  as su mp ti on i s t ha t r elig ion  is b ein g u se d a s a  poli ti cal
tool  to u nd er mi ne  (over th ro w) t he Commun ist government . In light of the role that
re ligion  appear s to have played in th e di ss ol u tion of t he  comm un ist  gover nm en ts  of
Po land and th e former  Soviet Union, this fear may not be completely unfounded.
178. Id . at 16.
179. S ee Docum ent N o. 6, reprinted in  ASIA WATCH ‘92, supra  note 10 ,  app.  a t
30 (“In certain places, a few hostile elements ru n  rampant .  They  es tab li sh  il lega l
org an iza tion s an d t ry  to w re st  lea der sh ip of t he  mon aster ies,  Tao is t  t emples  and
churches from us. . . . At th e grassr oots level in some places, some people used
re ligion  to i nt er fer e wi th  gove rn me nt  ad mi ni st ra ti on,  th e ju dicia l pr ocess and
edu cat ion  in  sch ools .”).
180. S ee LUTZ, supra  note 168, at  18.
181. S ee id . at 20.
m is un der sta nd ings  and  hos t i l e  conf ron ta t ions  were  a lmos t
l imi t l e s s .175
At  the  same  t ime,  t h e Chines e foun d it imp ossible to
comprehend the  mot ive  of the foreign m ission ar y in abandoning
h is homelan d to prea ch to th e un inter ested  Chines e.176 S ince
th ey a l rea dy ha d th eir own tea chings, an d th ey had  not invited
the foreigner , t he Chin es e r ea son ed  t h a t th e mot ive for his
coming mu st d erive from th e missionari es’ need s  and  the needs
of  the West.177
Chr is t ian ity was also seen  as  disr up tive  to social h ar mon y.
An 1812 dynast ic decree prohibiting evangelism ha d stated:
“Reflect ing that  the said religion [Christianity], neither holds
sp ir i ts in ven era tion  nor  an cestor s in  rever ence, clear ly this  is
to wa lk  con t r a ry to sound doct r ine; and  the common peop le  who
follow  an d familiar ize themselves with su ch delusions, in what
resp ect do they d iffer  from a  rebel m ob?”178 The governmen t  of
Chin a  today similar ly equat es believers in  Chr i st i an ity  wi th  the
“rebe l mob” wh ich  poses  a  t h rea t  t o soci a l s t abi li t y.179
The growin g Chin ese n at iona lism  of tha t p eriod, wit h it s
resen tment of imperialism an d Ch ris t iani ty,  a lso began to take
on a  persona l  dimens ion .180 Chin a  w a s  n o longer  th e Midd le
Kingdom; it wa s only a  n a tion -sta te, fight ing t o pres erve  its
iden t it y in a  compet i t ive int erna t iona l community .181 As a
resul t of i t s i nt e ract ion  with the West, China was forced to
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183. S ee id . at 21-23. West ern  miss iona ries , work ing a s int erp ret ers  for U.S.,
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secu re clause s gua ra nt eeing t olerat ion of Christ ian ity a nd  gran t ing  ext ra te r r i tor ia l
r igh t s to W es te rn  mi ss ion ar ies  an d con ver ts , es se nt ia lly p ut ti ng  bot h a bove  th e r ea ch
of Chin ese la w. See id.  at  22. T h e  Ch i n ese people of tha t era  came to view th e
reli giou s freedom  obligations  of the t rea ties a s an  affront  to th eir sover eign ty and a
political tool of the  impe ria list We st. See id.  China wa s una ble to distinguish between
the West’s political and its  religious objectives, because “the right t o evangelize had
been obt ain ed v ia W est er n d iplom at s a nd  gu nb oat s.” I d . a t  22-23. The same will be
t rue today of the Wolf-Specter bill, if it is passed.
184. S ee id . at 18-19.
185. S ee id . at 285.
186. Id . at 26.
187. Id . at 285.
re cognize oth er civilizat ions a nd , with  th em, t heir  compet ing
ideologies and values.182  Chin a  wa s a lso begin n in g t o become
aware of th e inequa lity of th e post -Opium  War  tr eat ies it  ha d
ent ered  in to wit h t he  West  in t he  mid -nin et een th  cent ur y.183
T h e Chin es e t r ansfe r red  the feeli ngs  of na t ion a l h umilia t ion
s temming from thes e even t s t o them selves persona lly. They
ass ociated  th ose feelings of “profoun d hu miliat ion,” “great
su fferin g,” “foreign  ins ult s,” “sh am e,” and  “bowed  head” with
the adven t  of t he  Chr is t ian m ission ar y,184 who, pr ecisely
because  of his daily involvement  with t he Chines e, was th e
closest  and  mos t  concre t e embod imen t  of the  humil ia t ing
Western imperialism.185
As described by Lutz, “[t]he dua l role of man y missionar ies
inext rica bly link ed im per ialis m a nd  mis sions  in th e minds of
the Chin ese.”186 “For  many Ch inese , Chr ist ianity could never
aga in  be diss ociated from im per ialis m.”187 For eign r eligion is
st ill in ext r ica bly  lin ked  wit h  im pe r ia lis m for  the Chin ese
govern men t . Litt le of the em otion of th e issu e ha s cha nged  in
the las t s even ty yea rs . Those  pow er fu l em ot ion a l fa ctors of
na t iona l an d per sona l hu milit y, which  mot ivat ed t he a nt i-
Chr ist ian  movemen t s of t he  n ine t een th  cen tu ry and  r es u r fa ced
in  th e An t i-C h r ist ia n  Move men ts of t he 1920s , a re s t ill  on  the
su rfa ce of Chine se-U.S . conflict over fr eedom  of religion t oday.
C. T he Ch in ese V iew  of L aw  an d  Proper  Con duct
 There a re  t remendous  di ffe rences in t he way p eople in  the
Unit ed St at es a nd  people in  Chin a view t he r ule  of law. F irst,
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BASIN L.J . 138 , 17 6-77  (199 6).
192. S ee id . at 176.
193. S ee LUTZ, supra  note 168, at 21 (explaining that  “[t]he concept  o f T ’ien hsia ,
t h e Empe ror’s manda te to ru le all under  heaven , ceased to be viable,” when Ch in a
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194. S ee Cha n, supra  note 191, at  174.
195. Id . at 174.
196. S ee Louis H enk in, The Hum an Rights Idea in Contemporary China: A
Comparative Perspect ive, in  H UM AN  RI G H T S  IN  CON TE MP ORA RY CH I N A 7, 27 (R. Rand le
Edwards  et al. eds., 1986) (“China be gins w ith  th e society, t he collectiv ity, a nd
concent rat es on ge ne ra l (not  ind ivid ua l) welfa re .”); see also Lucia n W. P ye, The Sta te
and the Individual: An Overview Interpretation , in  TH E  IN D I VI D U AL  AN D  T H E  STATE IN
CH I N A 16,  17 (B ri an  Ho ok e d.,  199 6) (“The in dividua l [in Chin a] ha s consist ent ly been
seen  as mer ely a disciplined mem ber of some larger  gr oup  . . . . At  th e cor e of
Chinese et hi cs a nd  mo ra lit y t he re  ha s a lwa ys b ee n t he  ide al  of de pr es sin g se lf-
interest  an d gl or ifyin g se lf-sa cri fice for  th e coll ect ivit y.”).
197. Rega rding th e sub ordin at ion of the in dividua l to th e sta te in  Chin ese cult u r e
and history, one author ha s stated t hat “[i]t could be that n o people ha ve eve r
out don e the Ch inese in ascribing mora l virtues to th e stat e or in  depreca t ing the
wor th  of the in dividu al.” Pye, supra  note 196, at  16.
198. Chan , supra  note 191, at  174.
“Chin a  is r ule d by m en  mor e t ha n by la w.”188 F rom the tim e of
the Zhou D yna st y (B.C.E. 1040-256), the k ings were given t he
reli giou s t it le,  “Son  of He ave n.”189 They  were heaven’s
repr esent at ives on  the  ea r th ,  and  held the  Manda te of Heaven ,
a s long as they properly fulfilled their duties.190 The power  of
the ruler was a b sol u te, an d t he  people h ad  an  abs olut e du ty t o
obey.191 As  a  resu lt ,  there  was  n o concept  of limit ing
govern men t  powers by law.192 Although  the v iab il ity  of the
Manda te of Heaven has since disappeared,193 t he  idea  tha t  the
ru ler is u ltim at ely m or e  impor t an t  (more  wor thy of r e spect )
than  th e ru le has  per sisted. As  a  resu lt ,  Ch inese  l aw lacks  the
same “definiteness” that  we expect  of law in Wester n
societies.194 In t he West , in th eory, our  laws “derive fr om  t he
people so that th e natu ral and political rights of th e individual
a re stressed;”195 bu t  in  China ,  the needs  and righ ts of
indiv idua ls ar e subordin at e to th e collective196 an d to th e ru ler
(today, the  CCP).197 As a  conseq uen ce, Chin ese “laws ” ar e in
rea lity  mor e like “ ‘political inst ru men ts’ of th e governmen t ,
designed  to ach ieve some change in  soci et a l norm or  some
specific objective.”19 8 As  was shown above,  wi th  respect  to the
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199. Jay R. Goldst ein, Com men t, Ch in ese and  Wes tern  T reat y P ra ct ice: A n
Ap pli cati on  to t he J oin t D eclar at ion  Bet ween  th e Peopl e’s R epu bli c of China and Great
Britain  Con cern in g th e Qu esti on of  Hon g Kon g, 1 AM . U. J . IN T’L  L. & P OL’Y 167, 175
(198 6).
200. Ann  Ken t, Waiting for Rights: China’s Hu m a n  Rights and Ch ina’s
Constitutions: 1949-1989, 13 HU M . RTS . Q. 170 , 17 7 (19 91).
201. S ee Hen kin , supra  no t e 196 , a t  27 ( “No  independe n t  judiciary or other body
exis t s to insist on a n int erpr etat ion of the const itut ion differen t from th at des ired by
the poli ti cal  or ga ns , or  to e nfo rce  it  ag ai ns t h igh  poli ti cal  au th or it y.”).
202. The re seem s to be n otable , recen t evide nce of Chin a ’s growing commit ment
cur ren t law s in  Chin a s afegu ar din g rel igious fr eedom , th e
purpose of the la ws  is  not  so m u ch  t o protect religion as it  is to
p romote social ha rmony , increased  economic p rogress , and  the
eve ntua l dem ise of r eli gion .
The idea t ha t law is t o be an inst ru men t of the s t a t e, used
wh en  necess a ry t o accompl ish  pol icy objectives, is an impor tan t
key to un ders ta ndin g th e beha vior of th e Chinese governmen t ,
and to in ter pr et in g Ch in es e p romises . On e CCP  commen ta tor
said: “If [interna tional law] is useful to our count ry, to socialist
ent erpr ise, or t o th e pea ce ent erp ris e of the w orld, we w ill use
it.  However, if this inst rumen t  is  disa dvantageou s t o our
coun t ry, to socialist en ter prises or to peace enterp rises . . . we
will not  us e it .”199 Cons equ en tly, a nyon e wh o is looking t o
in terna t iona l agreemen t  as a  mea ns of enforcin g r eli giou s
freedom  rights in China will be disappointed. For centuries,
Chin a  has  opera t ed by the ru le of men  ra ther  than  the  ru le  of
law. Un til s ign ifica n t  e ffor t s  a re made,  both  from with in  and
withou t , t o e st ablish the r u le of l aw, C hin a’s in ter na t ion a l
agreemen t s will provide little det err ence against  human  r ight s
abu ses  wh en  those  abu se s a re vi ewed  as n ecess a ry for  the good
of the  st a t e .
Sim ilar ly, th e four  Chines e const itut ions adopted  since 1949
have been descr ibed as  “mor e like  politica l pr ogra ms .”200 The
Chinese cons t it u t ion  has n one of t he for ce of th e U.S .
Con s t itu t ion . The re a re n o cour ts  with  power  to int erp ret  it .2 0 1
It  is little m or e  t h a n  a st at emen t of policy, which may be
followed, un t il t he id ea s or  in ter es t s of t he r u lin g el it e d ict a te
oth erw ise. The re fore, a nyon e looking t o the Chin ese
cons t it u t ion  for enforcem ent  of religious free dom r ight s will be
disappointed, un t il  Ch ina  r eaches the  poi n t where  it  v iews  the
ru le of law a s ben eficia l t o the power  and p rosp er it y of the
sta te. 202
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t o th e est ablis hm ent  of the r ule of law . See infra no t e 237  and accompany ing  t ex t .
203. S ee Wins ton  Hsia o, Comm ent , Th e Development of Hum an R igh t s  in  t he
Republic of China On Taiw an: Ram ifications of R ecent Democratic Reforms and
Prob lem s of E nf orcem ent , 5 PAC . RI M  L. & P OL’Y J . 161 , 16 4 (19 95).
204. S ee id . at 165-66.
205. S ee id . at 166.
206. S ee id . at 168.
207. Rober t F. Dodd s, J r., S ta te E n terprise Re form in  Ch ina: Managing the
Tr an sit ion  to a M ark et E conom y, 27 LAW & P OL’Y IN T’L BU S . 695, 717 (1996) (cit at ions
om it te d).
208. Id .
209. S ee Hsia o, supra  note 203, at  169-70.
A fur ther  pr oble m wit h  the enforcem en t  of huma n rights in
Ch ina  is t ha t t he w hole idea  of ind ividua l hu ma n r ights i s
Wester n  in na tu re.203 The t rad it iona l Ch inese approach  to
“individual r i gh t s” d iffe r s from t ha t  of the  Wes t  in  tha t  (1 ) the
individual wa s n ot de fined  by a s et  of right s bu t b y th e
ind ividua l’s rela tion sh ip wit hin  fam ily an d villa ge comm un ity;
(2) the culture was duty -orien te d, em ph as izing obliga tions to
fam ily and  society; and (3) th ose duties wer e en forced not by
law  but  by li, or the et hical code.204 So,  a lthough Ch inese l aw
was not  des igned to g ran t individual hum an rights, individual
r igh t s wer e na tu ra lly prot ected  whe n a ll people a cted p roper ly
with in  th e est ablis hed  rela t ion sh ips a nd a ccording t o the
(Confucian) eth ical code.205
Because  th e r ole of Chine se la w wa s t o ser ve the  in t e res t s of
the s t a te ra the r  than  those  of the ind ividua l , an  independen t
judicia ry  never  came in to existen ce in tr adit ional Chines e
society. 206 This  “un der developm ent ” of China ’s lega l in st it u t ion s
is a  sign ifica n t  ba r r ier  to en forcem en t  of Wes ter n-type r eli giou s
freedom  righ ts . In  su m, th e “Chinese  cour t s  a re beholden  to
govern men t  au thor i ti es, their  de cis ion s a re s ubject  to in formal
pa r ty review, and  they  have  few aut on om ous enforcement
power s.”207 In  ad dit ion, “[m]ost  judge s la ck u nive rs ity le gal
educa t ion , an d ma ny ar e believed to be cor rup t  [by Wes tern
st an da rd s].”208
Another  problem wi th the  a tt empt  to a s ser t  Weste rn -type
individual hu m a n  r ight s in  th e Pe ople’s Rep ublic of China  is
tha t  th e people them selves ha ve a deep-r ooted be lief in t he
system  of e th ics  and the  r el at ion a l, d u ty-or ien ted  app roach
toward society described above.209 Even  in  the Rep ubli c of
Chin a  on Ta iwa n, wh er e fift y years of evolu t ion  have l ed  to the
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210. Id . at 169.
211. S ee id . at 170.
212. Id .
213. S ee Cha n, supra  note 191,  at  175  (“Th e Con fucia n e mp ha sis  on p er son al
relationships, ho ne st y, h igh  mo ra l st an da rd s, a nd  loya lt y t o on e’s gr ou p a ffects eve ry
as pect  of in div idu al  an d or ga ni za ti on al  life  in  Ch in a. ”).
214. CHR ISTI AN  J OCHIM , CH I N E S E  RE L I G IO N S 123  (198 6).
215. S ee generally Cha n, supra  no t e 191 , a t  175; J O C H I M , supra  note 214, at  123-
25.
216. Chan , supra  no te  191 , a t 1 75 (ci ta ti on  om it te d) (e mp ha sis  ad de d).
i n st i t ut ion  of a “fully Wes te rn ized lega l syst em ,”210 the people
a re relu ct a n t  to asser t  the ir  individua l  r igh t s aga ins t  the
sta te. 211 This ph enomen on is difficult for t he West e r n  m ind  to
comprehend , but mu st be considered when discussing the issue
of human r igh t s  in  China :
[In  Ta iwa n ,] des pit e con st itu tion al  an d s ta tu tor y p rov ision s
gr a n t in g in div idu al s t h e r igh t t o su e t h e st at e for  an y
de pr iva tion  of rig h ts , Ch in es e s ocie t y a s  a  w h ole  h a s n ot
c la imed  o r  a s se r t e d t h a t  power .  .  . .  An  ind iv idua l  wh o  sues
a no the r  h as  pla ced  h is in te re st s a bove  th ose  of th e gr ou p, a n d
t h u s fa ce s s t ron g  dis a pp r ov a l. C on s eq u en t l y,  p eople  ar e n ot
accus tomed  to s u in g ea ch ot h er , m u ch  le ss  su in g  th e
“pa te r na l i s t i c” s t a t e . 212
Las t ly, th e influ en ce of Confu cian  te ach ings  is k ey to
unders tand ing how la w is viewed  in Ch ina ,2 1 3  a s well as
unders tand ing how the United  S ta tes  may help in  China’s
process of grad ua lly establishin g a more definite an d
permanent ru le of l aw. Con fuciu s s t res se d t he im por tance of
the idea l m oral gen tlem an , one wh o “ta kes  righ tn ess for h is
bas ic na tu re.”214 In  th at  pr ocess, t he  ind ividu al m us t cu ltiva t e
the two mora l  and humanist  va lu es  of (1) ren , a m ora l feeling
toward other s (“bein g h umane”), and (2 ) yi, a form  of int egrit y
(fait hfulness, loya lt y, a nd ju st ice). 215 The r elationsh ip between
the development  of t h is  human  idea l  and  the developmen t  of
law  in Ch ina  ha s bee n d escr ibed in  th e following wa y:
T h is  pr ocess [of self-de velop m en t] fost er ed a  const an t s tr ug gle
be tween  li, wh ich  is C on fucia n  socia l h ar m on y, cu s t om a r y
n or m s  of b eh a v ior , a n d  ru l ing  by  examp le , and  f a ,  wh ich  i s  t he
wr i t t en  o r  en a c t e d la w of t h e le ga list s. Ch ina  ha s cont inu al ly
lea n ed  toward s l i  over  fa because  i t  i nc ludes  t h e  n or m at ive
ru les  of m ora lity  an d p rop er  beh av ior. 216
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217. Id .
218. I d . (al ter at ion in or iginal) (quot ing T H E  AN A LE C T S  OF  CO N F U CI U S  WI T H  H IS
DI S C IP L E S AND CE R T AI N  OTHERS , Vol. I, Book II Concerning Government , Ch. III, 8
(Lady Ho sie  ed . & W illi am  Ed wa rd  Soot hh ill t ra ns ., O xfor d U ni v. P re ss  193 7)).
219. Id .
220. Id .
In  English it  could be said t h a t Ch ina h as a lways lean ed
toward proper conduct over law. Th at  exp la ins  why , as  one
au thor  ha s noted, “the CCP’s at tem pts  to creat e a form al le gal
system  is  [sic] st ill  in flu en ced  by t he Confucia n  pr efe ren ce for
socia l pr ess ur e over t he  us e of [legal] force.”217 Those
respons ible for U.S. policy on re ligious per secut ion in Ch ina
should unders tand Chin ese fa ith  in t he  su per iorit y of li (proper
condu ct) over fa (writ te n la ws). Confu cius t au ght :
I f you  gover n t he  peop le  b y  l a w s  [ fa ] ,  and  keep  th em in
o r d e r by  pena l t i e s ,  t hey  wi l l avo id  the  pena l t i e s , y e t  lose t he ir
s en s e  of sh am e. B u t if you  gove rn  th em  by y ou r m o r a l
exce ll ence , and  keep  th em  in  or de r  by  you r  du ti fu l con du ct [l i],
t hey  w il l r e t a in  t h e ir  se n s e  o f s h a m e, a n d  a ls o liv e u p  t o t h is
s t a n d a r d . 218
This  form ula for effective governa nce cou ld  se rve a s a  gu ide for
those in Congr ess  wh o fee l t ha t  the U nit ed  St a tes  must  not
“keep  silent” any longer but instead “take action” against
religious persecution and h uma n rights abuses abroad.
V. TOW ARD  A BE T T E R  U.S. RE S P O N S E
 The approach  t aken  by Congres s  in  th e Wolf-Spect er b ill is
one of “govern ing t he  people b y law s,” an d “keep ing t he m in
order by pen alt ies.”219 Confucius t augh t  tha t  the  resu lt  of tha t
form of govern an ce is tha t t he people will “avoid the pen a ltie s,
yet lose t he ir s en se of sh am e.”220 I t  should be clea r  tha t  China
will avoid the penalties and yet lose its sense of shame i f the
United Stat es takes this step.
There a re  seve ral re as ons wh y th e Wolf-Spect er b ill, if
enacted, will fail (in Ch ina ) to obta in it s objective of relieving
re ligious  pe r secu t ion . F ir s t , th e Wolf-Specter bill will be viewed
by the Chinese governmen t  a s  an  a t t empt  by  the  Un i ted S ta t es
to govern  the in ter na l policy of t he P eople’s Rep ublic of China
un der  th e guis e of religion . Such  in ter fe rence  wi th  the
sover eign  power  of the n at ion wh ich wa s once t he M iddle
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221. As long as Western  powers try t o force religious free dom on Ch ina , th ough,
the Chin ese gover nm ent  will associat e religion  with  impe rialism, and view it as a
pol it i ca l tool of the  West . 
222. Thou gh the Chinese government  is not likely to let go of its an i m osi ty
toward religion a nyt ime soon , th ere is  eviden ce tha t officials  within the Communist
pa r ty ar e beginn ing t o recognize r eligion’s poten tia l ut ility. Recent ly,  Li  Ru ihuan ,
Chairman  of th e N at ion al  Com mi tt ee of t he  Ch in es e P eop le’s P olit ica l Consu lta tive
Kingdom, th e center coun try of th e world, will not be tolera t e d.
The sanctions  contem pla ted  by th e bill ar e sim ply
inconse que nt ial,  a  mere annoy a n ce, in compa rison to wha t
Chin a  sees  th at  it h as  to lose if it  bends t o the will of th e Unit ed
Stat es.
Chin a  still stin gs un der t he  memory of the unfair mid-
n ine teen th cent u r y t r eaties that  it  entered into with t he West.
It  rem ember s th e perceived n a t i on a l  a n d i n di vi du a l
humi lia t ions tha t  i t  su ffe red  a t  the hands of economic
imperialism. I t  is  consciou s t oday of t he  ve ry r ea l t h rea t of
cu l tu ra l imper ialism. Thes e ar e rea l concer ns,  wh ich  the Unit ed
St a tes  too ea si ly brush es  off. In  sh ort , th e Wolf-Spect er b ill will
fail t o a ffect  posit ively th e level of religious fr eedom  in Ch ina ,
because  Ch in a  wou ld  ra ther  su ffer  the economic impact of U.S.
sanct ions th an  suffer th e ideological impa ct of ceding some of
its policy power to the United States.
Second, th e govern men t  of China  i s fundamenta l ly ,
ideologically, opp ose d t o the p rogr es s of r eli gion ; su ch
o p p o s i t i o n  i s  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  f r a m e w o r k  o f
Marxism/Leninism/Maoism. Economic press ur e, or any other
k ind of p ressure from ou ts ide China ,  cannot  change tha t
fundame n t a l r ea li ty.  Fur the rmore , China  i s not  ignor ing the
que st ion of reli giou s freed om. It  is int ens ely concerned  with  the
que st ion of religion but  is dea ling w ith t he pr oblem in its  own
wa y. As  long  as the  cu r ren t gover nm en t r em ain s in  power , an y
expa ns ion of r eligious  freed om in  Chin a m us t b e a ccord ing t o
t he ter ms  of the gover nm ent , an d consequ ent ly will be
motivat ed only by the desir e  t o u n it e t he “belie ver s a nd n on-
believers” in order  t o i ncrease socia l ha rmony , and  thus
productivi ty . If the Chinese government can be convinced that
reli giou s freedom will promote the stability  an d economic
growth  of th e coun tr y, then  religion will be tolerat ed as a
means to an end.221 Religious fr eedom  will probably not be
viewed as a n en d worth y in itself for a  long time.222
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Con fer en ce and a  member  of the P olitical Burea u Sta nding Committ ee of t he CCP
Cent ra l Com mi tt ee,  not ed t ha t “[m ]an y r elig iou s d octr ines such  a s  t hose  conce rn ing
et hi cs and m orals are consistent  with th e tren ds of social development a n d  t he
pr omot ion  of cu lt u ra l a nd e th ica l p rogres s in  the c ou n t ry. ” China Continues to
Promote Freed om  of R eligi ous  Bel ief , XI N H U A E N G . NEWSWIRE , J an. 23, 1 998, available
in  1998 WL 2785391.
Third, religiou s fr eedom  cann ot  n ow be ad van ced in Ch ina
by appea l ing to Weste rn  ideas  abou t  the  freedom of the
ind ividua l. For t he Ch inese (both  the  government  and the
gover ned ), the collect ive  is  more impor tan t  than  the  ind iv idua l.
Tha t reality is compounded by the fact that China lacks the
judicia l inst i tu t ions necessar y to enforce individua l right s, even
if th e people of China  were will in g t o ass er t  them . Re sp ect  for
the ru le of law mu st be est ablished  before t he pr oclaimin g of
individual hu ma n r ight s in  Chin a w ill ha ve an y me an ing.
Es tabl ishment  of th e ru le of la w is  a lso necess a ry be fore
China’s own cons tit ut ion an d t he in ter na tion al a gree men ts  it
en t er s i nt o will begin t o produ ce a m ore bin din g effect on  its
int er na l policy.
The way Ch ina  per ceives its r elationsh ip with oth er
mem bers  of th e int ern at ional comm un ity is not bound  up by
laws an d legal relat ionships bu t by proper  conduct  and  persona l
relationships. Tha t  is  why the Wolf-S pe cter  bil l wi ll h ave s uch  a
devasta t ing imp act  on th e pr ogress  of U.S. int ere st s in  China .
Whether or  not  t he  same  would be true of the United Sta tes’
re la t ionsh ips in oth er p ar ts  of the wor ld, th e Wolf-Spect er b ill
will be a h eavy blow t o th e alr ead y st ra ined  rela tion sh ip
between  the United  S ta tes  and China .  And  un t il  the ru le of law
is furt her  esta blished in  China , ther e is almost  noth ing else to
base cooperation on besides that  relationship.
There is hope for  full freed om of religion in  Chin a, bu t it  will
take some time, and it will not be as easily obtained as the
d ra ft e r s of th e Wolf-Specter  bill expect . The re  ar e t hr ee t hin gs
tha t  mu st occur  in order  for r eligious freedom t o be able t o
begin  to gr ow in  Ch in a . F ir st , t her e m ust  be  a  change fr om
with in,  a fun dam ent al sh ift in th e expectations of the Chinese
people. The world view tha t t he Un ited St at es would like to
secure t o t he Chinese p eople as th eir ina lienable righ t (by
econ omic force) is  su ch  a  foreign  idea  to the va st  major it y of
people in  China  now tha t  they  would ha rdly kn ow how or be
inclined to m ak e us e of it, eve n  if it  was in the United Stat es’
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223. Unl ike the a pproach of the Wolf-Specter bill, the ar gumen t her e s u pposes
tha t  fre edom  can not  be e na cte d by g over nm en t fia t, a nd  th at  it w ill n ot a u t o m a tically
appear  f rom noth ing when ba rr iers t o its exer cise ar e rem oved. Ins tea d, th is
dis cus sion  supposes that freedom  m u s t  grow from within (perhaps with outs ide
nour ishmen t ) and  tha t  ideas a r e  fr eedom’s  sun  and r a in . A lthough i t  is  doub t fu l
wheth er  su ch a n or gan ic pr ocess  can  be r us he d, t he re  is s ome  evid en ce t ha t fr eed om
ideas ar e ta kin g root in  Chin a a t a n u npr eceden ted  ra te. S ee Micha el C. Davis,
Chinese Perspectives on Hum an Rights, in  H UM AN  RIGHTS AND CH I N E S E  VAL U E S  3, 4
(Michael  C. Davis ed., 1995) (“If one looks beyond the r ath er dire Chines e hum an
r igh ts record of recent years and considers the world of ideas in  China  as  an
ind icat ion  of emerg ing valu es, th ere is  room for som e optim ism t ha t h um an  righ ts
cond iti ons  and  protect ion  in  China  m ay eve nt ua lly im pr ove.” (em ph as is a dde d)); see
also infra  text a ccompa nying note 247.
224. F o r historical examples of China’s misinter pret at ion of t he  mot ives  of
Weste rn missionaries, see supra  Pa rt  IV.B (discussin g Chin a’s ant i-imper ialism /ant i-
Chr i st i an mov em en ts ); see also supra note ** and  accompanying t ext  (quot ing the
s t a t emen t  of director of Chin a’s Burea u of Religious Affairs  t h a t  “C la ims tha t  Ch ina
practices ‘reli giou s p er se cut ion ’ are  . . . b as ed  on  ul te ri or  mo ti ves ”).
225. T h e r e is alr eady s ome eviden ce tha t Ch ina ’s incr ease d involvem ent  in t he
world  economy in th e last 15 years h as helped st rength en  th e r ule  of law. S ee Br ian
Hook , R esh ap in g th e R elat ion sh ip b etw een t he I nd ivi du al a nd  th e S ta te in  China:
Iss ues  in  the Approach  to  a New Equ i libr ium , in  TH E  IN D I VI D U AL  AN D  T H E  STATE IN
CH I N A 1, 6 (Brian  Hook ed., 1996 ) (“[T]he reform  an d openin g out  policies, which  in
power to give. There has to be a change in expectat ions and a n
excha nge  of freedom  ideas before freedom in th e American way
of th inkin g can be valued, or even r eceived.223
One wa y t o faci li t a te tha t  sh ift  i s to p romote  access to the
outside world, through study abroad, low-level business
conta cts, mutua l  fore ign  inve st m ent , an d political dialogue. By
shu t t ing down economic ties with  China , the Wolf-Spect e r  bill
runs th e risk of foreclosing one of the only ways th e Unit ed
Sta tes  has  of increas ing  the acces s  of t h e Chines e people and
the Chin ese gover n m ent  to the  “Amer ican  va lues” tha t
Congress is so concer ned  abou t  pr omot in g. The U .S. effor t  a t
p romot ing reli giou s fr eedom  m us t  be  done  from with in  the
cont ext  of a frien dly re lat ionsh ip, or it  will be incomp reh ens ible
to China, except in terms of ulterior motives.224
Increa sed access to the rest of th e world w ill also h elp
p romote the s econ d fu nda men ta l ch ange t ha t  must  occur : the
es tabl ishment  of the r ule of law. The m ore th at  China  becomes
in tegr a ted  in to the globa l econ omy, t he m ore it will  of necessit y
learn  to be governed by law. As business con t a cts increase
between  th e tw o coun tr ies, Ch ina  will l ea r n  tha t  i t  cannot
opera t e i n the  la rger  econom ic comm un ity, wh ich it h as  lar gely
been left out  of, un less it  is willing to abide by the ru le of law.225
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Chinese Court s will then  na tu ra lly be given broader
ju r isdict ion , more  binding au thor i ty,  and will expan d in n um ber
and ability to meet the increased lega l need s of an e xpa nd ing
m ark et  economy. The  significan ce of th is cha nge is  th at  it wil l
take place not  in th e vacuum  of an  ideological discussion bu t
day-by-day at  every leve l of society. As th e ne ed for out side
informat ion (t ech nologica l, economic, political, a nd  legal)
becomes  ever mor e crit ical, it will be  impossible for the Chinese
govern men t  to cont ain t he flow of news (v ia  the  In te rnet  and
persona l con tact s  with  fore igners ) to the  Chinese people . If t he
Unit ed Sta tes is a ble to leave some  room for  Ch ina  to r e t a in  it s
dignit y as it  enters th is new, more open relationship,226 i t  may
be possible to avoid the anti-imperialist r eact ion  tha t
accompa nied  China’s in crea se d com mer ce wit h  the We st  a lm ost
a  hu nd re d yea rs  ago.227 Although a spects of Western  cu l tu re
will flow into Ch ina , a spect s  of Eas t ern  cult u re will  flow b ack to
the Wes t . C h ina  th en w ill not feel t he h um iliat ion of cult ur al
exp loit a t ion  by th e West , but  will s ee  t he  mutua l
tra nsform a t ion  as a n  in evi t able  res u lt  of the in ter act ion  of
friendly nations.
The th ird  change  tha t  mus t  occu r  is  t h a t  the Un ited St at es
must  back  away from the us e of force in  i t s a t t empt  to in fluence
Chinese pol icy on r eligious  freed om. Th is cha nge  i s necessa ry to
pave the way for t he p reviou s t wo chan ges. In  Confucian
though t , socia l order  is ach ieved  by m ea ns of a  fixed n umber  of
specified rela t ion sh ips,  wh ich  are base d on  “st a t us,  level of
in t imacy an d sit ua tion al cont ext .”228 It  i s impor tan t  to note  tha t
t hese relat ionships define power, a nd a re “vertically orient ed
with t he power diss emina ted  from the  top-down.”229 Four  of the
five tra ditional relationships ar e “unequ al” in tha t  t hey  requ i re
the part ies to conform t o predeter mined  dominan t  and
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subord ina te roles. The four  un equa l relat ionships a re fat her  to
child, elder  br oth er  to youn ger  br oth er , husband  to wife , and
ru ler t o subject .230 The only relat ionship of equals ava i lab le  to
an  individua l  under  Confucian  thought  is  that  of fr i end  to
friend.231 Chin a will r esist  U.S. in ter est s a s long a s it  per ceives
tha t  t he  Un i ted S ta t es  is  t rying t o take for  it se lf t he r ole of
r u ler  and force China to play subject. The United Sta t e s  m u st
seek, if at  all p ossible, t o help Ch ina  per ceive th e re lat ionsh ip
as one of fr iend  to frien d. All other  Confucian  rela tion sh ips a re
pre de t erm ined by th e un kn owable “hea ven” of Confucian
though t ; consequently, the dominant -subordinate relationships
cannot  be a lt ered withou t  caus ing  di sharmony . But  the
re la t ionsh ip of fr i end  to fr i end  is  one  tha t  is  chosen by human
bein gs, and is presuma bly beyond the purview of the fates.
Neith er  friend st an ds above th e other  in  pow er . Th ey a re bound
together  not  by a ny du ty im pos ed  on t hem  bu t  out  of a d u ty
th ey chose.
The United  S ta tes  has  the chan ce to choose the  re la t ionsh ip
it  will crea te  wit h Ch ina  in t he  next  deca de. On e does n ot h ave
to agr ee with  Chin ese policy or app rove of Chi n a ’s  act ions  to
recognize  tha t  i f t he  Un i ted S ta t es  wan t s  t o p romote  ind iv idua l
hu ma n r ights in  China , it mu st ba ck awa y from force.
Dur ing th e ear ly Novembe r 19 97 H ouse d eba te on  th e nin e
pieces of an ti-China  legislat ion m ent ioned above,2 3 2
Repr esen ta tive  Bereu ter , who voted a gainst  th e legis la t ion ,
said: “The objective t ha t ever yone will pr ofess so loudly on t his
floor  t oday wil l come in  t im e if w e d o not  blow it. Ma kin g Chin a
our  adversa ry will n ot  advance p olit ica l [or ] reli giou s
r igh t s . . . .”233 T h er e  a re signs t ha t Ch ina wa nt s to chan ge, but
the United  S ta tes  mus t  not  “blow it.” It mus t st ep back  and give
Chin a  room t o ma ke t he  cha nge . Recently, Chin es e Min is ter  of
Jus t i ce Xia o Yan g expr es se d Chin a’s h ope  to refor m it s p olit ica l
sys t em. He said, “it appears to be out of step with the times to
con t inue to follow th e m et hods  of the  wa r e ra .”234 Xia o called
the establishment of greater socialist  d em ocracy  a  “h i stor ica l
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Su pport, WA S H . P O S T, J an . 12, 1998, a t A13, available in  1998 WL 2461538.
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leap” wit h  de ep  rep er cuss ion s for  Ch i n a, n ecess a ry bot h  for  the
long-ter m develop men t  of the economy a nd for  pol it ica l
st ab ility. 2 3 5  “From theory  to p ract i ce  we  must  estab li sh  .  .  . t he
refor m and ope nin g of ou r  lea der sh ip.”236 F ina lly,  r egarding the
lega l syst em, Xiao sa id: “We m u s t  con t inue to re form and
perfect th e judicial s yst em, r ais e th e qu alit y of th e judicia l
t eam, st ren gth en t he s yst em of res pons ibility a mon g judicial
pers onnel . . . over come loca l  and min is te r ia l  protect ion i sm and
re alize  legal ju st ice.”237 Admittedly those are grand words, bu t
it  is  unde nia ble  tha t  Ch in a  has m ade  rea l progr es s in  som e
areas in recent years.238
One sign ifica n t  and e ncouragin g r ecen t  exa mple of polit ica l
change occur r ing from with in th e Chinese government  is a
document writt en November  20, 1997, by Fa ng J ue, a
busines sman  an d form er d epu ty d irect or of the  pla nn ing
commission  in t he coas ta l city of Fuzh ou, Ch ina .2 3 9  The
document is ent itled “China Need s a N ew Transformat ion—The
Dem ocrat ic Fact ion ’s  P rogram Proposa ls.”240 The “proposals”
outlined  in the  documen t  ca ll for  unpr ecede nted  refor m
measur es: elections a t  a l l leve ls  of gover nmen t , fr eedom  of th e
press and  re ligion, a  fur th er  open ing of th e economy t o fore ign
companies, a n d a p ro-Amer ican  foreign  policy.241 Althou gh only
Fang’s sign a ture a pp ea rs on  the d ocum e nt ,  he cla ims  tha t  the
pr oposals  a re t he r es u lt  of “a ser ies  of discu ssions  wi th p ro-
democracy mem bers  of th e Chin ese Com m unis t  Pa r ty,
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ C A R- F IN . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
606 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
242. Id . Fang sa ys that “a couple of hundred of them [CCP members] , most  a t
‘upper  mi ddl e’ levels , ha ve p ar tici pa te d in  infor ma l dis cus sion s [lea din g to t he
formula t ion of F ang’s  pl a t for m  sta tem en t ] ov er  a  pe r iod o f t im e. ” Id .
243. Wei J ingsh eng & L iu Qin g, Edit oria l, Sign al From Ch ina, WA S H . P O S T, Feb.
1, 1998, a t C9, available in  1998 WL 2465237.
244. Id .
245. Id .
246. S ee Mufson , supra  note 239 at  A13.
247. F o r the  impor ta nce of ideas in th e development of freedom, see supra  no t e
223 and  accompanying t ext .
inclu din g Cen tr al Com mit te e m em ber s.”242 If tha t  cla im is tr ue,
then  the document  signa l s a  very significan t developmen t.
Wei J ingsheng , China’s  top  pol it i ca l diss iden t , r ele ase d fr om
prison  in November 1997, h as called Fa ng’s document  a
“ground-break ing pol icy  sta tement” and  u rges  the  in te rna t iona l
community to ta k e  n ot e of th is “ma jor polit ical sign al.”243 He
expla ins  th at  “[n]ever before in Chin a h as a  docum ent
advoca t ing democra t ic r e form come from within  the  ranks  of
the Communis t  Pa r ty. ”244 Con ser vat ive forces in  th e CCP  ha ve
by no means signed on  to what they must  see a s over -ha st y an d
over -br oad p roposa ls , bu t  Fan g  a sse r t s tha t  the  document
“reflect s th e political views of a n ew genera tion of govern men t
officials  in  their  for ties a nd fifties, views tha t differ
dra ma tically from t hose held by the Communist  Par ty  vete rans
in  th eir  seventies an d eigh ties  who occupy key lea der sh ip
posit ions.”245 Bu t  pe rhaps  mos t  tellin gly of all, th ough  th e
p la t form s t a t emen t  has been dist r ibu ted  to mem bers of t he
CCP Cent ra l  Commit tee , and  the government  is  thought  t o
have more  t h a n  two thousand political prisoners in jails and
la bor  camps  a t  p resen t , i t  has  t aken  no act ion  a ga inst  Fang’s
set  of program  proposals.246 The exa m ple of Fang Jue seems to
in dica te tha t  the world of idea s r egar din g freedom  is growin g in
China .247
There a re s t ill  many a rea s of Chin a’s con du ct  t h a t  the
Unit ed Sta tes m ay just ifiably be dissat isfied with, bu t  t he re a re
a reas for positive growth  between  the two count r i es . The
Unit ed Sta tes m ust  carefully choose which ba tt les it  is willin g
to fight . As stat ed by the N at ional Council of the Chu rches of
Christ, “not  a l l encroa ch m ents on  reli giou s fr eedom  r ise t o the
level of pers ecut ion. And , even when  th ey do, we mu st be
carefu l to act  in  a  way t h a t a lleviates ra th er t ha n a ggravat es
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the pr oblem.”248 The  NCCC a lso ma de t he ver y pr ofoun d point
tha t  “some mea sur e of hum ility is r equ ir ed  as w e a ct  to st op
reli giou s per secut ion out side th e Un ite d St at es. . . . ‘Alth ough
we cher ish  the Am er ica n  mode l of r eli giou s l ibe r ty and  it s
me an ing for u s, we r ecognize t ha t it  is n ot t he  only m odel.’”249
VI. CO N C L U S I O N
 Ch ina  l acks  the k ind  of re ligious  freedom tha t  we espouse in
the West, and ther e a re  ser ious a nd  br ut al h um an  righ ts
viola t ion s in  China  connected  with  tha t  l ack  of freedom.  But  the
approach  contem pla ted  by th e Wolf-Spect er b ill will a gg ravate
ra th er  than  reli eve  the p roble m. At  th is  crossroads, th e Unit ed
Sta tes  must  extend the hand of friendship  t o China in those
areas where there is com m on ground, and in so doing, exercise
a  portion of faith  in th e Confucian  tea ching th at  “if you govern
them  by your  mora l excell en ce, a nd k eep t hem  in  orde r  by your
du t ifu l conduct , th ey will re ta in their  sense of sham e, and also
live up  to t his  st an da rd .”250
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